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Abstract: 
This article challenges existing accounts of the development of the 
Euromarkets by arguing that their emergence constituted the foundational 
moment in the advent of post-war Anglo-American developmental field. 
The account contends the notion of a post-war order shaped predominantly 
by the outward expansion of American financial power, by de-privileging 
the exclusivity of American power and arguing that co-constitutive Anglo-
American developmental processes were the generative force that 
produced the Euromarkets. Drawing upon new archival material, the article 
suggests that an Anglo-American developmental sphere, in which Britain 
continued to play a crucial but subordinate role, was integral to the 
unfolding of post-war financial globalisation. The Anglo-American 
developmental processes occasioned by the Euromarkets gave rise to a 
‘transatlantic regulatory feedback loop’ that stimulated deregulation on 
both sides of the Atlantic and placed Anglo-American capitalist 
interdependence at the centre of the politics of globalisation .  The deeper 
origins of financial deregulation lie in the transformation of Anglo-American 
finance during the 1960s.  
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Anglo-American Development, the Euromarkets and 
the Deeper Origins of Neoliberal Deregulation 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article challenges existing accounts of the development of the Euromarkets by 
arguing that their emergence constituted the foundational moment in the advent of 
post-war Anglo-American developmental field. The account contends the notion of a 
post-war order shaped predominantly by the outward expansion of American 
financial power, by de-privileging the exclusivity of American power and arguing 
that co-constitutive Anglo-American developmental processes were the generative 
force that produced the Euromarkets . Drawing upon new archival material , the 
article suggests that an Anglo-American developmental sphere, in which Britain 
continued to play a crucial but subordinate role, was key to the unfolding of post-
war financial globalisation. The Anglo-American developmental processes 
occasioned by the Euromarkets gave rise to a ‘transatlantic regulatory feedback loop’ 
that stimulated deregulation on both sides of the Atlantic and placed Anglo-
American capitalist interdependence at the centre of the politics of globalisation .  
The deeper origins of financial deregulation lie in the transformation of Anglo-
American finance during the 1960s. 
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Introduction 
 
 The emergence of the Euromarkets has commonly been understood either as 
a consequence of the changing relationship between states and markets, or as a 
product of the outward expansion of American finance. This article challenges 
prevailing accounts. Drawing upon archival material from the Bank of England and 
the Treasury, the article proposes that the Euromarkets were central to an emerging 
Anglo-American developmental sphere.1 Anglo-American developmental processes 
occasioned by the Euromarkets played a defining role in the politics of globalisation, 
spawning novel institutional forms of hybrid Anglo-American financial development 
in the City of London. These Anglo-American dynamics transformed the regulatory 
                                                        
1 The term ‘Euromarkets’ applies to transactions of offshore currency in two distinct but 
related markets: the ‘Eurocurrency/Eurodollar’ and ‘Eurobond’ markets.  
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orders on both sides of the Atlantic in a highly interactive manner, eroding the 
regulatory architecture of the post-war Keynesian state in Britain and destabilising 
American New Deal regulations. Anglo-American dynamics also reordered the 
broader regulatory context of international banking through the development of 
offshore and the emergence of the Basle regime. The Euromarkets set in motion a 
‘transatlantic regulatory feedback loop’ that destabilised transatlantic regulatory 
regimes. Many of the deregulatory moves in Britain and America during the 
ideological transformation of the ‘neoliberal era’ were incubated during the 1960s.  
The article begins by reviewing existing literature on the Euromarkets, 
suggesting that scholars have overlooked the constitutive role of Anglo-American 
development. An alternative conceptual framework, focusingupon the institutional 
connectivity underpinning Anglo-American development, is then outlined.  In the 
second half, the article turnstowards the institutional outcomes of Anglo-American 
development by examining evidence on Anglo-American interest rate 
interdependence alongside previously unpublished archival evidence from the Bank 
of England and the Treasury, some of which has only recently become available 
under the thirty-year rule. This evidence reveals the impact of arriving American 
banks upon the institutional development of the Bank of England and the 
integration of Anglo-American money markets. A number of novel institutional 
developments, emerging from the co-constitutive interaction of Anglo-American 
finance, and their significance for the broader transformation of the international 
financial system, are discussed. Finally, the article explores the impact of the 
transatlantic regulatory feedback loop and its significance for understanding the 
deeper Anglo-American origins of financial deregulation.  
 
 
States, markets and the Euromarkets 
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 4 
The debate over the Euromarkets has focused upon three main themes: firstly, 
attempting to identify their specific historical origins,2 secondly, understanding 
their relevance to Britain’s national development3 and, finally, their relevance to the 
international transformations associated with the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system.4  Within the IPE literature, a subset of scholars has argued that the 
emergence of the Euromarkets was functional to the deepening of American 
structural and financial power associated with American hegemony or imperialism.5 
The IPE literature on the Euromarkets has been criticised for reducing the 
debate to a simple dichotomy between state and market.  Responsibility for the 
development of the Euromarkets is then accorded either to state agencies or market 
operators.  In reality the responsibility for the emergence of the Euromarkets is 
hard to pin down in bifurcated terms. In Britain the key institution, the Bank of 
England, acted as an interface between the state and the market and played the 
roles of ‘poacher and gamekeeper’ simultaneously.6 Blurring the boundary between 
state and market renders conventional IPE accounts of the Euromarkets highly 
problematic. 
Gary Burn’s excellent corrective to the ‘states versus markets’ dichotomy has 
captured many of the institutional and historical specificities of the Euromarkets’ 
                                                        
2 See: Geoffrey Bell, The Euro-dollar Market and the International Financial System, (London: 
Macmillan, 1973); Catherine Schenk, ‘The Origins of the Eurodollar Market in London: 
1955-63’, Explorations in Economic History, 35  (1998), pp. 221-238. 
3 See: Gary Burn, The Re-Emergence of Global Finance, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); 
Geoffrey Ingham, Capitalism Divided? The City and Industry in British Social Development, 
(London: Macmillan, 1984). 
4 See: Fred Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States 
International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977); Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the 
International Monetary System, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Eric Helleiner, 
States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s, (London: 
Cornell University Press, 1994) 
5 See: Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance, 
(London: Verso, 1990); Martijn Konings, The Development of American Finance, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011); Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin ‘Finance and American 
Empire’, in Panitch and Konings (eds),  American Empire and the Political Economy of Global 
Finance, (London: Macmillan, 2009), pp. 17-48; Susan Strange, ‘The Persistent Myth of Lost 
Hegemony’, International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 551-574. 
6 Burn, ‘The State’, pp. 227 and 241. 
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origins. Burn’s account, however, neglects the substantive impact of Anglo-
American development in recalibrating global capitalism. It is with the interlinking 
Anglo-American developmental processes and institutional transformations arising 
from the Euromarkets, rather than their historical genesis, that this article is 
primarily concerned. Burn’s assertion that the importance of the Eurodollar market 
lies ultimately in, ‘the resurrection of an institutional state structure reminiscent of 
that which defined the pre-1931 City-Bank-Treasury nexus’, overlooks the way in 
which the British state wasqualitatively transformed through its incorporation 
within an Anglo-American developmental sphere. 7  By arguing that the City 
effectively regained its autonomy through the Eurodollar market, Burn neglects the 
extent to which the arrival of the American dollar and American banks in London 
drew American state power into the affairs of the City and redefined British 
sovereignty.8 
 Power did remain concentrated within the City-Bank-Treasury nexus, yet it 
was articulated through and embedded within a new, fundamentally distinctive, 
order of Anglo-American finance. The City-Bank-Treasury nexus remained 
dominant within the British state because it was able to integrate itself within an 
internationalising Federal Reserve-Wall Stre t-Treasury nexus at the heart of 
American capitalism. This new order of Anglo-American finance, embedded within 
an Atlanticised British capitalism, proved central to the incubation of financial 
globalisation and liberalisation that gravely undermined, in synchronicity, the 
Bretton Woods monetary order and national monetary orders  in Britain and the U.S.  
 
 A further grouping of scholars have pointed towards the special role that the 
U.S. has played in the constitution of global capitalism.9 Panitch and Gindin view the 
collapse of Bretton Woods and the emergence of financial globalisation not as a 
consequence of globalising markets escaping the control of national states, but 
                                                        
7 Burn, ‘The State’, p. 227; Burn, ‘Global Finance’, p.184. 
8 Burn, ‘Global Finance’, p. 135. 
9 Gowan, ‘Global Gamble’; Panitch and Gindin, ‘Finance and Empire’; Konings, ‘American 
Finance’. 
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rather as a result of the international expansion of American finance.10 Similarly, 
Konings critiques adherents of the ‘states versus markets’ approach for missing the 
extent to which the globalisation of finance from the 1960s was an outgrowth of 
American finance.11 
 These accounts provide an indispensable tonic to the literature that, 
misleadingly, viewed globalisation in terms of the ‘retreat of the state’. Theorists of 
American power have, however, overlooked the emergent Anglo-American field of 
developmental interactivity that was fundamental to financial globalisation. We 
need to look beyond the expansive dynamics of American finance and towards the 
co-constitutive developmental processes that occurred through the interaction of 
bankers and monetary officials in the City and New York. This requires that we de-
privilege the exclusive role of an outward expansion of American finance or 
unilateral American ‘structural power’.  
  Konings’ account makes important correctives to the structural power 
approach by challenging the ontologisation of the states and markets separation and 
elucidating the historical co-articulation of state power and structural power within 
US capitalism. Despite this modification, however, his explanation of post-war 
financial globalisation is overreliant upon a notion of the externalisation of internal 
American developmental dynamics and America’s role in, ‘shaping the preferences 
and influencing the structural conditions under which other actors make 
decisions’.12 Britain’s causal force in authoring financial globalisation is rendered 
invisible. Accordingly, the City becomes an analytical vacuum into which American 
banks simply move in the face of limits upon their internal development. The City is 
reduced to a release valve for the contradictions of American finance.13 This focus 
elides the manner in which American structural power was constituted through 
transatlantic interactivity. As formulated by Strange, structural power never came 
                                                        
10 Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of 
American Empire, (London: Verso, 2012), p. 119. 
11 Konings, ‘American Finance’, p. 88. 
12 Martijn Konings, ‘The Construction of US financial power’, Review of International 
Studies, 35(1) (2009), pp. 69-94. 
13 See: Konings, ‘Construction of US power’, pp. 86-87; ‘American Finance’, pp.93-98. 
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 7 
to terms with the complex processes of uneven and combined international 
development that generated, often quite accidentally, the institutional capacities 
that underpinned America’s post-war power.14 Without highly contingent and 
specific institutional developments within Britain, that reflected the agency of 
specific social forces and state managers as they wrestled with the distinctive 
challenges of managing Britain’s transition to post-imperial power, there would 
have been no spatial fix for American finance. British state institutions and 
merchant bankers pulled in American finance by adapting their institutional 
orientations and capacities and Atlanticising British capitalism.  
This required a redefinition of sovereignty, both in terms of the spatial 
extension of regulatory responsibility for the Bank of England and the embedding of 
the fiscal basis of the Treasury within the Euromarkets. The under-theorised status 
of the constitution of political-economic space in American power approaches leads 
to an under appreciation of the centrality of the City’s entrepôt role in furthering 
globalisation.15 Britain’s state had been internationalised par excellence during the 
19th century and it was this legacy that was revitalised through the emergence of 
‘offshore’ as a novel form of political-economic space. The intersection of capitalist 
and state agency, through the lobbying power of key merchant bankers, was central. 
In broader terms, Britain’s longstanding entrepôt role was redefined through 
‘offshore’ to cope with the demise of sterling and harness the dollar. By missing 
these dynamics Konings, along with other scholars, overstates the domestic origins 
of the US turn to monetarism and neoliberalism from the late 1970s and obscures 
the developmental impact of the transatlantic regulatory feedback loop in driving 
financial deregulation.16 It is not enough to read off financial globalisation from the 
                                                        
14 Strange’s formulation of structural power is circular: America has structural 
power because it can shape the choices and preferences of other actors, but it can do 
so only because it already has acquired structural power. There is no notion of how 
structural power capacities develop diachronically within this ahistorical tautology. 
15 For a discussion of the problem of political space in Panitch and Gindin’s work 
see: J.Z. Garrod ‘A Critque of Panitch and Gindin’s Theory of American Empire’, 
Science & Society, 79:1 (2015), pp. 38-62.  
16 See: Konings, ‘American Finance’; Greta Krippner, ‘Capitalizing on Crisis: The 
Political Origins of the Rise of Finance, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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‘development of American finance’, we need to problematise ‘Anglo-American 
development’ as the creation of a distinctive form of transatlantic political-economic 
space, more broadly. American banks may have filled that space, but it was the 
British state and British bankers that constructed the ‘offshore’ environment that 
enabled financial globalisation through the City and integrated Anglo-American 
capitalism.This was not, therefore, simply a case of the internationalisation of the 
American state, but rather a synthetic form of Anglo-American development that 
ensured that the American Federal Reserve-Treasury-Wall Street nexus was 
articulated in and through the City-Bank-Treasury nexus in Britain. In the process, 
both national capitalisms were transformed, with a reduction in monetary policy 
autonomy and a deeper integration of their respective financial systems. The post-
war period was not only about the US state structuring the options of other national 
capitalisms, its own policy options and business strategies were structured by 
developmental dynamics driven by social forces in Britain. Understanding this is 
crucial to understanding the subsequent role of Anglo-American leadership in 
driving forward the politics of financial globalisation.  Recognising the significance 
of Anglo-American development serves as an important corrective to the overstated 
role of neoliberal ideology in shaping financial globalisation from the 1980s.17 Many 
of the deregulatory dynamics consummated during the neoliberal era arose as a 
response to processes that emerged during the crisis years of Bretton Woods. 
  
 
 
Conceptualising Anglo-American Development 
 
 
                                                        
17 See in this regard: David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Joel Krieger, Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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 IPE scholars have emphasised cycles of UK/U.S. hegemony, but rarely considered 
the interactivity of Anglo-American development.18 Examining Britain and the U.S. 
within a unified analytical lens allows us to uncover the constitutive dynamics of 
‘Anglo-American development’ that generated American structural power in the 
post-war period by securing dollar hegemony. The emergence of the Euromarkets 
represents a key instance of Anglo-American development. It sowed the seeds for 
financial globalisation and gravely undermined the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates. The flows of hot money unleashed by the Eurodollar market 
destabilised sterling and the dollar during the 1960s and 1970s.19 By increasing the 
exposure of these two key currencies to speculative attacks, the Eurodollar market 
played a central role in the collapse of fixed exchange rates.  But, paradoxically, the 
Euromarkets entrenched the hegemony of the dollar, ensuring its international 
supremacy even after its fixed convertibility to gold was terminated.  
The lineages of Anglo-American development can be traced back much 
further, to the interwar years. The First World War debilitated Britain and 
strengthened its U.S. creditor.  With sterling and the British economy weakened, the 
City was forced to draw upon American financial support in order to re-launch the 
gold standard and restore sterling convertibility.20 As sterling weakened and the 
dollar strengthened, the management of the two currencies became increasingly 
intertwined. Britain’s singular role at the centre of the global financial system was 
de-privileged and the U.S. became integral.21  
The failure of Anglo-American management of the inter-war international 
monetary system had a formative impact upon the priorities instituted at Bretton 
                                                        
18 See: Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the 
Mutlinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1975); Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
19 Block, ‘Origins of Disorder’, p. 197; Susan Strange, ‘The Dollar Crisis 1971’, International 
Affairs, 48 (1971), pp. 191-216. 
20 Kathleen Burk,‘The House of Morgan in Financial Diplomacy, 1920-30’, in McKercher (ed) 
Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy, (London: Macmillan, 
1991), pp. 125-158; Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and 
the Rise of Modern Finance, (London: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 276. 
21 Block, ‘Origins of Disorder’, p. 14; Konings, ‘American Finance’, p. 71. 
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Woods. Anglo-American collaboration formed the foundation for the post-war 
international economic order constructed in New Hampshire.22  The new regime 
instituted at Bretton Woods was a direct response to the challenges faced during the 
1920s and 1930s.23 And just as Anglo-American dynamics had been central to the 
interwar period, they were now institutionalised through the Bretton Woods 
agreement. 
A series of key institutional connections between state managers and 
bankers were at the heart of deepening Anglo-American interdependence. The 
Treasuries and central banks of Britain and the U.S. were brought into ever-closer 
contact by their attempts to manage the international monetary system. The 
significance of the City-Bank-Treasury nexus within British development has been 
identified.24 While for the U.S., IPE scholars have recognised the significance of the 
Federal Reserve-Treasury-Wall Street nexus. 25  Scholars have not, however, 
identified the extent to which the Federal Reserve-Treasury-Wall Street complex at 
the heart of American capitalism, has been articulated in and through the 
corresponding City-Bank-Treasury nexus within Britain. This was the broader 
transatlantic context within which the emergence of the Euromarkets occurred.  But 
the key dynamics also reflected the specificiti s of national capitalist development 
within bothcountries. It is to the particular trajectory of Anglo-American 
development that the analysis now turns. 
 
 
Regulatory embrace and regulatory escape 
 
                                                        
22 Peter Burnham, The Political Economy of Post-war Reconstruction, (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1990); John Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36 
(1982), pp. 379-415. 
23 Eichengreen, ‘Globalizing Capital’, p. 91; Louis Pauly, Who Elected the Bankers? 
Surveillance and Control in the World Economy (London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 
45. 
24 Ingham, ‘Capitalism Divided?’.  
25 Gowan, ‘Global Gamble’; Panitch and Gindin, ‘Making Global Capitalism’. 
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Britain’s 1951 Conservative government was keen to restore the City’s international 
role. But they faced a central dilemma, the international predominance of sterling, 
crucial to the City’s former pre-eminence as an entrepôt centre, was no longer. The 
Conservative ambition to restore the City appeared increasingly incompatible with 
the need to maintain sterling’s fixed exchange rate. For British merchant banks and 
the City to regain their international predominance and fulfil the Conservative’s 
political aspirations to restore the old order of the British state an alternative means 
would have to be found. The solution was the Eurodollar. 
British banks were only able to maintain their international standing by 
switching into the dollar. As British power waned, 26 Not surprisingly, then, it was 
the merchant banks that led the Euromarkets charge, setting the stage for the City’s 
rebirth within a new Anglo-American financial order  
The ‘offshore’ status of the Eurodollar market was unique. An informal 
approach to regulation in the City allowed the Euromarkets to flourish and 
effectively split the British banking system in two.27 In order to do this, the City 
developed a new accountancy category: where at least one party to the transaction 
was British, the transactions were defined as ‘onshore’, but where both parties were 
non-British the transactions were marked in a second ‘offshore’ set of books.  
Offshore was an accounting device that embedded a sovereign bifurcation within 
the City’s regulatory order: onshore activities and entries were subject to national 
financial regulations, while offshore transactions, conversely, fell beyond the 
national regulatory remit and within a laissez-faire order of self-regulation spatially 
within, but juridically beyond, the post-war Keynesian state infrastructure of 
financial control. 28  By developing an ‘offshore’ regulatory orientation and 
accountancy technique, the City was able to perpetuate its entrepôt role through the 
                                                        
26 Geoffrey Jones, British Multinational Banking, 1830-1990, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
pp. 248-287. 
27 Burn, ‘City and State’, p.226. Schenk describes this regulatory context as one that, 
‘encouraged innovation as a means of evading controls while tolerating such innovations ex 
post’: Schenk, ‘Origins of Eurodollar’, p. 233.  
28 Ronen Palan, The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad 
Millionaires, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 27-32. 
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dollar. It was the innovation of ‘offshore’ finance then, as a peculiar and intentional 
bifurcation of sovereignty, which enabled the City’s entrepôt role to continue. 
American finance could never have globalised as it did without this British 
institutional innovation.  
 At work here was a process of ‘regulatory embrace’ by which the City’s 
merchant bankers and the Bank of England welcomed the emergence of offshore 
dollar business within the City, establishinga symbiotic relationship with New York 
and the American monetary system.. Here the roles of George Bolton and Siegmund 
Warburg were central. Bolton, a former merchant banker employed by the Bank of 
England, was crucial to establishing the Bank’s early acceptance of the Euromarkets. 
Siegmund Warburg, one of Britain’s premier merchant bankers, was instrumental. 
Warburg had been deeply critical of the limited integration brought about through 
Bretton Woods, calling for greater capital mobility as well as closer financial ties 
between Britain and the US as early as 1950.29 He would be influential in pulling the 
Treasury deeper into the Euromarkets during the 1960s.   
Bolton and Warburg visited America in 1962 to gauge the American mood on 
Eurobonds. Bolton subsequently encouraged the Bank to enable Eurobond issues 
and by early 1963 the approval of the authorities was secured. The first ever 
Eurobond issue was signed in July of 1963, the deal was guided through by Bolton 
while Warburg’s banking house provided the signature.30  
For both Warburg and Bolton, the revival of London’s role as an international 
capital market dealing in foreign currency was a mechanism for promoting British 
entry into the EEC by enhancing the City’s continental appeal. Unbound from 
sterling, the City would be beneficial to the EEC and Europeans would not have to 
prop up an ailing currency. Warburg’s correspondences with the Bank implicitly 
threatened that failure to liberalise London’s capital markets might lead to an 
exodus of merchant bankers towards alternative European financial centres in an 
                                                        
29 Niall Ferguson, High Financier: The Lives and Times of Siegmund Warburg, 
(London: Penguin, 2010) pp. 159-160. 
30 Ian Kerr, A History of the Eurobond Market: The First 21 Years, (London: 
Euromoney, 1984). P14. 
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exercise of ‘capital flight’ discipline over the state that would become all too 
common in the era of globalisation.31  
The development of the Euromarkets was driven by the agency of merchant 
bankers in conjunction with state institutions, demonstrating the tight linkages 
between private bank power and the development of the state’s institutional 
capacities. It was the agency of key forces within Britain that facilitated the 
internationalisation of American finance and they did so in order to pursue their 
own distinctive ends of retaining domestic hegemony and deepening European 
financial integration. By doing so they in fact structured American policy options, 
not vice versa, reversing the lines of causality established by American-centric 
perspectives on structural power.  
 The regulatory embrace of the City’s merchant bankers and the Bank was 
matched by a correspondent ‘regulatory escape’ of American banks from the 
restrictive New Deal regulatory regime in the US. Interactivity between the dollar 
supply, monetary policy and the status of the City as an entrêpot centre anchored 
the emergence of the Euromarkets within Anglo-American development.  
After the Great Depression, American monetary authorities introduced 
‘Regulation Q’ and the Glass-Steagall Act.32 Regulation Q capped the interest rate 
that American banks could offer for depositors, while Glass-Steagall maintained a 
strict division between commercial and investment banking.  Despite this restrictive 
context, American finance experienced prolonged growth after the war.33 
By the later 1950s, however, American banks were frustrated by New Deal 
regulations. 34These restrictions  prompted a ‘regulatory escape’ by large American 
banks seeking to sidestep New Deal regulations and take advantage of London’s 
burgeoning offshore business. In the years that followed American banks overcame 
entered the offshore regulatory space of the City, transforming Anglo-American 
capitalism in the process. 
                                                        
31 Ferguson, High Financier, pp. 209-218. 
32 Bell, ‘The Euro-dollar Market’, p. 9. 
33 Konings, ‘American Finance’, p. 100. 
34 Ibid, p. 107. 
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AClose cooperation  between the Fed and the Bank emerged during the 1960s, as it 
became increasingly clear that collaboration was required to reinforce the 
stuttering Bretton Woods system. These measures gave further impetus to  the 
Euromarkets. 
 Successive U.S. administrations attempted stopgap measures to assuage the 
balance of payments and stabilise the dollar. 35  The Americans were also 
increasingly drawn into the management of Britain’s crisis-stricken monetary policy 
as Britain’s balance of payments problems deepened. From 1964, supporting the 
existing sterling-dollar rate became a fundamental component of U.S. international 
monetary policy.36  Added to this was a simmering geopolitical consideration: the 
Americans’ willingness to support sterling was linked to Britain’s presence in South 
East Asia. The State Department made clear that support for sterling was contingent 
upon Britain acting as a bulwark against communism in the region. Furthermore, 
the U.S. relied upon the Euromarkets to meet the capital needs of American MNCs 
abroad within a context of domestic restrictions on capital outflows and deficits 
fuelled by Vietnam.37Anglo-American monetary cooperation was therefore tightly 
linked to geopolitical considerations. 
    
 
 
Anglo-American financial synthesis in the City 
 
American banks arrived in Londonen masse during the 1960s. By 1975, 58 U.S. bank 
branches had been established in the City.38  This section draws upon archival 
material from the Bank of England to examine the consequences of American entry 
                                                        
35 Eichengreen, ‘Globalizing Capital’, p. 126. 
36Ibid, pp. 123-125. 
37 Catherine Schenk, The Decline of Sterling: Managing the Retreat of an International 
Currency, 1945-1992, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). pp. 167 & 10.  
38 Richard Sylla, ‘U.S. Banks and Europe: Strategy and Attitudes’, in Battilossi and Cassis 
(eds) European Banks and the American Challenge: Competition and Cooperation in 
International Banking Under Bretton Woods, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.  
53-74. 
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into the City. This led to a synthesis of Anglo-American banking practices, increased 
Anglo-American interest rate interdependence and constraints upon the autonomy 
of policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic. It also transformed the Bank’s 
institutional orientation towards a transatlantic outlook. 
For the Bank , the arrival of the Americans raised crucial questions about  
regulation. While for British bankers, their arrival presented a potential competitive 
challenge. But for both the Bank and the bankers, their arrival was also a major 
opportunity. By invigorating and expanding the scope and depth of the Euromarkets, 
the American invasion offered British bankers the chance to take a bigger slice of a 
rapidly growing pie, even if their relative share declined.  
The American influx boosted the standing of the Euromarkets and by 
association, the Bank. This was reflected in the banks status as the epistemological 
authority on the Euromarkets. The arrival of the Americans, enabled the Bank to 
reassert its centrality and significance within the British state and international 
financial community. It was through its interconnection with offshore American 
finance and deepening ties to the Federal Reserve-Treasury-Wall Street nexus that 
the Bank recovered its pre-war international prestige within an international order 
dominated by American power. But the arrival of the Americans also raised 
troubling questions about the status of British merchant banks and increased  
Britain’s sensitivity to American economic policy. 
 The ‘spatial-fix’ of escape into the City necessarily brought about complex 
questions regarding sovereign authority.. American banks now depended upon a 
foreign central bank, but the Bank would be expected to hold closer ties to the old 
order of the City’s banking elite than to the American interlopers.  
For the US Treasury and the Fed, the American takeover of the Euromarkets 
was similarly Janus-faced. By escaping the New Deal regulatory parameters and 
dependence upon the domestic dollar supply, the American banks gravely 
undermined the capacity of American fiscal and monetary policy to control banking. 
This would become all too clear from the mid-1960s. But they had also, quite 
unintentionally, alleviated some of the pressure on the U.S. balance of payments, by 
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tapping in to offshore dollar flows, and intensifying the global standing of the dollar 
as a vehicle currency.  
 The scale and pace of the American capture of the Eurodollar market was 
breath-taking. Figure 1.1 below depicts this. Current account deposits of overseas 
residents represent Eurodollar market deposit-taking and the increase is accounted 
for overwhelmingly by increased dollar deposits. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 about here 
 
 
We can see in figure 1.1 that British Overseas and Commonwealth Banks 
experienced a major loss of relative market share, with their share of Eurodollar 
deposits dropping from c.40% in 1962, to c.25% in 1970. Accepting houses also 
experienced a severe contraction of their market share, from 20% down to 8% 
between 1962-1970. For American banks the story was very different. Their share 
of Eurodollar deposits rose precipitously, from just over 20% in 1962, to around 
55% in 1970. 
 By disaggregating deposits into sterling and non-sterling we get a clearer 
picture of the vast take-off in Eurodollar deposits from figure 1.2.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 about here 
 
For American banks, the growth in deposits of overseas residents was 
overwhelmingly accounted for by a sharp increase in non-sterling (i.e. dollar) 
deposits. The low level of sterling deposits remained remarkably stable over the 
period. 
 Contrastingly, British Overseas and Commonwealth banks (figure 1.3) 
experienced much more gradual increases in the volume of non-sterling deposits 
from overseas residents. Whereas American banks experienced a sevenfold increase 
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in the volume of overseas non-sterling deposits between 1965-1970, British 
Overseas and Commonwealth banks experienced a threefold increase. British banks’ 
relative gains were limited, but they now participated in a level of market expansion 
unimaginable without the influx of American banks and the corporate client base 
that they brought with them. 
 
Figure 1.3 about here 
 
How did the Bank respond to the Americanisation of the Eurodollar market? The 
following archival evidence from the Bank captures the reaction to the arrival of the 
Americans and provides crucial insights into the mechanisms underpinning the 
intensification of Anglo-American development. The Bank really took notice of the 
Americans from 1963, as documented in the regular meeting of Euro-currency 
experts at the BIS. Reporting on the 1963 meeting, Bank officials acknowledged that 
London branches of American banks were more active than before in the Eurodollar 
market, with U.S. businesses borrowing there rather than New York.39  
Correspondence between the Treasury and the Bank provided the primary 
channel of  Euromarkets policy formulation and prompted further development of 
communication channels between them. As well as pulling in American state and 
financial power, then, the Euromarkets helped to solidify the institutional 
interdependencies between the Bank, the Treasury and the City. Bank officials 
outlined the parameters of their responsibility for Eurodollar activity in these 
exchanges.40 In correspondence with the Treasury, Bank officials made clear that 
what applied for British banks, regarding the Bank stepping in as a lender of last 
resort, ‘cannot be held to apply in the same measure at all to the London branches 
                                                        
39 Bank of England Archives 6A123/1 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro 
Currencies- Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/1/64-31/7/65’, Report on Meeting of 
Experts on the Euro-currency Markets at the BIS, November 9th -11th 1963. 
40 BoE Archives 6A123/5 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro Currencies- 
Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/1/68-31/5/69’, Memo from Treasury to the Bank 
of England requesting Prime Ministerial brief on the Eurodollar market, October 22nd 1968. 
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or subsidiaries of foreign banks’.41 London branches of foreign banks were not 
viewed as the responsibility of British authorities but rather those of their head 
offices. Beyond the head offices, national central banks from the originating country 
would take ultimate responsibility. This discussion occurred within a context 
whereby London branches of American banks now accounted for 30% of deposits in 
the Eurodollar market.  
Crucially then, the City’s hosting of foreign banks did not entail a 
corresponding globalisation of the Bank’s lender of last resort function.  The 
American influx and the hybrid interaction of Anglo-American finance that this was 
occasioning in the City, were forcing the Bank to evolve its regulatory 
responsibilities in a manner that would have a hugely significant bearing on the 
future of international banking. 
As monetary conditions tightened in the U.S., the significance of the 
Eurodollar market increased dramatically. Between 1965 and 1966 a credit squeeze 
in the U.S. and the introduction of the ‘Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint’ 
programme led New York banks to turn to their London branches for funds. The 
Bank noted that this dynamic was practically ‘inevitable’ given that the traditional 
sources of liquidity within the U.S. had dried up. In fact, monetary conditions in the 
U.S. were so difficult that when a Bank official met with a senior member of the 
Chase Manhattan bank in early 1966, the Chase employee suggested that the 
Eurodollar market had been so important for reserve positions that, ‘without it, 
we’d have been dead’ .42 The Euromarkets enabled American banks to circumvent 
domestic restraints on credit in a way that severely undermined the policy 
autonomy of US officials and meant that the Americans were increasingly forced to 
look to London and the British authorities in order to manage their domestic 
banking system. Anglo-American development was eroding monetary autonomy on 
                                                        
41 BoE, 6A123/1: Letter regarding document to be prepared by the Bank of England in 
response to a Treasury request for information of the standing of the Eurodollar market, 
March 6th 1964. 
42BoEArchives 6A123/3 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro Currencies- 
Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/8/65-31/10/66’, Memo from Bank of England 
Overseas Office charting U.S. banks drawing dollars through London branches, August 22nd 
1966. 
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both sides of the Atlantic. Preoccupations with American structural power fail to 
capture this pronounced increase of American dependency upon British state 
agency. 
Johnson’s restrictive measures and the Fed’s credit crunch in 1966 werea 
watershed for American banks and the Euromarkets. 43 No longer taking only a 
passing interest in the market, American banks identified Eurodollar expansion as 
essential  to their business strategy.44 The Euromarkets transformed the business 
practices of American banks and integrated transatlantic money markets. 
The Bank’s position within the City enabled it to gauge the intensity with 
which the Eurodollar market was being shaped by changes in U.S. monetary policy. 
As more American banks decamped to London, their role in funnelling funds to their 
U.S. head offices led to an increasing interactivity of interest rates on each side of the 
Atlantic, a further symptom of intensifying Anglo-American interdependence.  As we 
can see in figure 2.1 below, a triadic interaction of interest rates evolved during the 
1960s: that between Bank Rate, the Eurodollar Rate and the Federal Funds Rate.   
 
Figure 2.1 about here 
 
 
The principal relationship here was between the Eurodollar Rate and the Federal 
Funds Rate, with the absence of interest rate ceilings enabling the Eurodollar Rate to 
be set consistently above that of the U.S. money market rate with the effect of 
drawing money out of the U.S. capital markets and into London. Figure 2.1 shows 
that UK Bank Rate was consistently the highest rate of the three. This was needed to 
maintain the attractiveness of sterling holdings in the light of the emergence of the 
Euromarkets but also a measure of sterling’s general weakness. But given the 
increasingly limited role for sterling as a trade and investment currency, and the 
                                                        
43 Daniel Kane, The Eurodollar Market and the Years of Crisis, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 
1983), p. 13. 
44 Richard Sylla describes this transformation aptly, suggesting that while American banks 
gave little consideration to operations in Europe before 1963 they, ‘thought about little else 
in the decade thereafter’:  Sylla, ‘U.S. Banks and Europe’, p. 62. 
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dominant role of the dollar, the impact of the sterling rate upon the price of dollar 
borrowing was not without limits. The differential between the Eurodollar Rate and 
the Federal Funds Rate was more important with respect to the price of dollar 
borrowing. 
 
Figure 2.2 about here 
 
 
 
 
 
Authorities on both sides of the Atlantic were aware of this dynamic. During a U.S. 
Treasury meeting in April 1963, Robert Roosa expressed discontent with the British 
monetary authorities, suggesting that they had pushed up Bank Rate in order to 
keep ahead of the Eurodollar Rate. It was understood that the British action might 
also push up the Eurodollar Rate, aggravating U.S. balance of payments difficulties 
through the resultant capital outflow.45 This dynamic is clearly evidenced in figure 
2.1, which shows that Bank Rate was the highest rate, with the Eurodollar Rate 
below it and the U.S. Federal Funds Rate consistently the lowest of the three. Apart 
from a three-year period, between 1968 and 1971, the British Bank Rate was 
highest.  
 During the mid-1960s this relationship intensified. As figure 2.2 shows, there 
was a strong correlation between the Eurodollar Rate and the U.S. Federal Funds 
Rate. Whilst during the early 1960s the Eurodollar Rate was kept marginally above 
the Federal Funds Rate in order to draw money away from the U.S. capital market, 
from the mid-1960s as the U.S. tightened its monetary policy, the Eurodollar Rate 
spiked in response to a massive surge in demand. This was a result of factors that 
the Bank had recognised: by drawing funds from their London branches the New 
                                                        
45 Burn, ‘Global Finance’, p. 158. 
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York banks were pushing up the price of Eurodollar borrowing.46 This dynamic is 
visible in figure 2.2, with the two Eurodollar Rate spikes that pushed it well over the 
Federal Funds Rate from 1965 to 1967 and then again from 1968 to 1971. 
 Anglo-American financial development in the City restricted the autonomy of 
US policy makers, necessitating greater cooperation and openness with British 
counterparts. Eurodollar movements exerted sustained pressure upon the 
international monetary system. Large-scale American borrowing introduced a, 
‘permanent element of demand’ shaped by economic conditions within the U.S.47 
This integrated the US, Eurodollar and European markets much more tightly. 
Consequently, European capital markets became more exposed to fluctuations in US 
monetary policy, creating a form of hub and spokes relationship. 48  These 
developments contributed to the increasing international monetary disorder of the 
later 1960s and early 1970s.49 
 Eurodollar flows into US money markets were discussed at the BIS in 1966. 
American bank branches had begun granting loans to the head offices of US 
corporations, who lent the money on to their overseas subsidiaries. This method 
was devised explicitly to circumvent the Interest Equalization Tax.50 When asked 
about the attitude of the US authorities towards this borrowing, given that it 
weakened the impact of US monetary restraint, Samuel Katz of the Fed replied that 
the borrowing was not a serious problem given its small size. Significantly, Katz 
added that these borrowings were in fact ‘welcome’ given that they had the effect of 
strengthening the dollar’s position and easing the US balance of payments. But as 
                                                        
46 B oE Archives  6A123/3 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro Currencies- 
Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/8/65-31/10/66’, Memo from Bank of England 
Overseas Office charting U.S. banks drawing dollars through London branches, August 22nd 
1966. 
47 Kane, ‘Eurodollar Market’, p. 13. 
48 Ibid. 
49 The ‘Eurodollar slop’, an expanding pool of ex-patriate dollars that tended to move 
predominantly back and forth across the Atlantic, was the underlying root of the dollar 
crisis of 1970/71 that preceded Nixon’s delinking from gold and the de facto termination of 
Bretton Woods: Strange, ‘Dollar Crisis’, p.  198. 
50 BoE Archives 6A123/6 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro Currencies- 
Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/6/69-31/3/70’, Report on the ‘Meeting of Experts 
on the Euro-Currency Market’, July 12th, 1966. 
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the Eurodollar market’s integration with the US money market intensified during 
the latter 1960s, the American attitude hardened. This tougher stance would 
culminate with a failed attempt to win tighter regulation of the markets. In the 
following decades, Euromarkets dynamics hosted in London were a continual thorn 
in the side of US policy-makers.   
 American bank borrowing from London branches surged in1968, stimulated 
by restrictive measures implemented by Johnson. In response, the Fed’s Andrew 
Brimmer suggested that while the Eurodollar market was based in London, ‘its basic 
driving force during the last year has centred in about a dozen large banks in the 
United States’.51 These banks turned to the Eurodollar market to compensate for the 
loss of domestic deposits. Brimmer acknowledged that bidding for Eurodollar funds 
by American banks had pushed up the Eurodollar Rate and made monetary 
management in the US more difficult. US policy makers were now a victim of the 
success of the dollar, finding their actions and autonomy severely constrained by the 
satellite role of the Euromarkets. By constructing the Euromarkets and drawing in 
the dollar, British merchant bankers and the Bank, in conjunction, set in motion 
dynamics that curtailed the scope of American policy-makers. The limits of US 
structural power were not therefore simply the result of developmental 
‘contradictions’,52 they were the product of the agency of British merchant bankers 
and the Bank of England as they used offshore to resuscitate the City’s entrepôt role. 
 
Banking on the Treasury   
British merchant bankers used the momentum of the Euromarkets to transform the 
fiscal basis of the British state, steering British development towards their interests. 
Pressures to change the financing of the nationalised industries reached fever pitch 
after devaluation in 1967. Eurobonds were now touted as a potential source of 
funds. The Treasury and the Inland Revenue discussed the possibility of easing 
                                                        
51 Bank of England Archives 6A123/6 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro 
Currencies- Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/6/69-31/3/70’,  Transcript of 
presentation given by Andrew Brimmer, ‘The Eurodollar Market and the US Balance of 
Payments’, November 17th 1969. 
52 Konings, ‘Construction of US Power’, p.80. 
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access to the Eurodollar market for British traders. The motivation here was the 
perceived benefit to the British balance of payments with reserves strengthened if 
traders borrowed outside the Sterling Area to finance domestic investment.53   To 
encourage Eurodollar borrowing, a new Bill proposed to make more interest on 
foreign borrowing tax deductible. 
The Treasury and the Bank overrode the Inland Revenue’s concerns about the 
potential impact of a relaxation of borrowing controls upon offshore tax havens. In a 
meeting between Treasury and Bank officials the increased balance of payments 
benefits post-devaluation were stressed. With confidence in sterling low, it was felt 
that any measures that could help bolster Britain’s reserve position were to be 
encouraged.54  The move towards greater Euromarket borrowing would have an 
additional benefit: reducing Britain’s exposure to destabilising short-term capital 
movements.  
By expanding the financing options available to firms, the proposal would lead to, 
‘the average lengthening of our borrowing abroad’, a step which was seen as, ‘in line 
with the Government’s policy of reducing the country’s sensitivity to short-term 
flights of funds’.  Increases in reserves derived from this practice would be a, ‘very 
real gain’, and, ‘would be recognized as such in every financial centre in the world’. 
55 The Bank firmly supported the proposal and the Treasury agreed that the Inland 
Revenue’s tax objections were, ‘insubstantial’.56 By the end of May 1968, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer had concluded that the balance of payments benefits 
outweighed the tax difficulties.57 Quite perversely, then, the growing offshore 
market that had enabled vast movements of hot money previously unseen during 
                                                        
53 National Archives IR40/16006 ‘Discussions with Financial Secretary, Treasury 
and Revenue on whether companies should be encouraged to borrow on Eurodollar 
market 1966-1978’, Memo from Treasury to Inland Revenue, 1968. 
54 NA IR40/16006, ‘Meeting between Financial Secretary, treasury and Bank of 
England Officials, 17th May 1968. 
55 NA IR140/16006, ‘Note by the Financial Secretary on Eurodollar Borrowing’, May 
1968. 
56 Ibid. 
57 NA IR140/16006, ‘Memo from Inland Revenue to Treasury Officials’, 29th May 
1968. 
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the post-war period was now viewed as the most viable means to insulate Britain 
from speculative movements.  Capital controls were ruled out and the solution 
appeared to be an even tighter integration with the vicissitudes of the Euromarkets.  
The increased appeal of the Euromarkets owed to the active lobbying of Britain’s 
merchant bankers from the mid-1960s. Treasury officials reported to the Inland 
Revenue that, ‘merchant bankers at home and abroad have been urging for some 
time that if certain tax impediments were removed U.K. firms and public bodies 
would be able to raise large sums in medium and long term issues of Eurodollar 
bearer bonds’.58  oremost among these merchant banker advocates was Warburg.  
In 1965 Warburg had, alongside Hambros and Rothschilds, pressured the Bank to 
exempt foreign bonds issued in London from stamp duty. They also pressed the 
Treasury to remove income tax deductions from interest on bonds issued by 
companies based in the UK.59 Harold Wilson relied heavily upon Warburg for 
financial advice during the 1960s, with his firm advising the government on 
currency questions and public sector finances.60 
Long term borrowing requirements of the nationalised industries had, since 
1956, been financed wholly through the Exchequer.61  This meant that their 
borrowing requirements were aggregated with other government borrowing. 
During the 1960s the funds required for borrowing had grown rapidly.  The 
problem became one of financing investment without weakening Britain’s balance 
of payments. Merchant bankers advocated greater Euromarket borrowing for the 
government, local authorities and the nationalised industries. Warburg declared to 
the Exchequer that borrowing from the Euromarkets would be “good for the 
credit”.62  
                                                        
58 NA IR140/16006, ‘Treasury letter to the Inland Revenue’, October 4th 1967. 
59 Ferguson, ‘Warburg’, p. 225. 
60 Ibid, p. 285. 
61 NA IR40/16006, ‘Memo from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Treasury’, 
September 13th 1967. 
62 NA IR40/16006, ‘Treasury paper on the possibility of borrowing abroad to 
finance the nationalised industries and local authorities’, May 25th 1967. 
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The City’s merchant bankers were pushing Britain deeper into the embrace of 
private capital markets. The lobbying efforts of Warburg and others bore fruit: in 
1969 the Gas Council raised £31 million through deutschmark denominated 
Eurobond issues, and by October of 1971 British public sector agencies had raised 
£51 million through this channel.63 The Euromarkets intensified banking power in 
Britain, not only by pulling American banks into Britain en masse, but also by 
energising merchant banker’s efforts to render government fiscal policy compatible 
with their interests.  
This was not simply a case of the outward expansion of American finance, then, 
or of the restoration of the old order of British capitalism, but rather the further 
intensification of a qualitatively distinctive Anglo-American sphere of development. 
The Euromarkets fundamentally Atlanticised British capitalism, bringing about a 
structural transformation in the orientation of key state institutions through which 
they embraced the emergence of offshore Euromarkets finance. In doing so they 
transformed the structures within which American policy makers and bankers 
operated and undermined the existing American financial order. 
 
 
The transatlantic regulatory feedback loop 
 
This section traces the dynamics and effects of the transatlantic regulatory feedback 
loop that emerged during the 1960s and stimulated processes of financial 
deregulation that gathered pace in the following decades. Bankers in Britain and 
America lobbied their national monetary authorities to enable further liberalisation 
to ensure the maintenance of competitive advantages, while central banks were 
forced to adjust their regulatory stance in response to the new challenges and 
jurisdictional ambiguities thrown up by the Euromarkets. By increasing the 
competitive pressure on British banks, the American influx destabilised the 
prevailing regulatory order within the City.  These dynamics would pave the way for 
                                                        
63 Ferguson, ‘Warburg’, p. 285. 
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the financial liberalisation that gathered momentum on both sides of the Atlantic 
during the 1970s and 1980s.  
It is in the 1960s, then, that many of the originating Anglo-American 
developmental processes that subsequently fed into financial deregulation are 
located. Although the continuity of transformative processes linking the ‘post-war’ 
and ‘neoliberal’ eras of global capitalism has been astutely observed, the peculiarly 
Anglo-American accent of these transformations and their situation within the 
broader context of post-war Anglo-American development, have been overlooked.64 
Crucially, these Anglo-American dynamics also transformed patterns of 
international financial sovereignty and contributed towards a major recalibration of 
international banking regulation.  
 Interdependent monetary dynamics between the U.S. and the Euromarkets 
during the later 1960s began to affect the regulatory stance of the Fed. In August of 
1969, the Fed introduced a 10% marginal reserve requirement for U.S. bank 
liabilities to overseas branches and on funds acquired by overseas branches from 
their U.S. head offices while also adjusting the required reserve level for other 
channels of offshore funding. The Eurodollar market was driving regulatory 
transformations on both sides of the Atlantic. Anglo-American developmental 
dynamics, centred upon financial integration, were at the heart of regulatory 
transformations in the world’s two most important financial centres. For their part 
American officials allowed Eurodollar expansion, but they certainly did not devise it 
as a coherent pre-planned strategy for augmenting American financial power.  
Nevertheless, there were regulatory changes undertaken in the U.S. in order 
to facilitate internationalisation.65 But on balance the regulatory and policy context 
within the U.S. was more disabling than encouraging, with tight money in the U.S. 
and attempts to restrict lending from domestic offices the principal policy catalysts 
                                                        
64 Konings, ‘American Finance’, p. 12; Panitch and Gindin, ‘American Empire’, p. 19. 
65 Andrew Brimmer and Frederik Dahl, ‘Growth of American International Banking: 
Implications for Public Policy’, The Journal of Finance, 30 (1975), pp. 341-363. 
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for international expansion.66 This was a case of the regulatory escape of American 
banks from the restrictive New Deal regulatory apparatus and the series of 
measures undertaken to curb the chronic U.S. deficits position in order to save 
Bretton Woods. Once the market emerged, however, American policy makers 
certainly did seek to make use of it in order to promote their perceived national 
interests. In this respect then, both Panitch and Gindin, and Strange, correctly 
highlight its functionality to the deepening of American financial power.67 American 
monetary authorities were coming to terms, in a complex and contradictory fashion, 
with an enormously fluid period in the history of the international monetary system. 
For the Bank, the regulatory pressure emanated from the arrival of American 
banks with large deposit bases and a desire to exceed the dealing limits of British 
banks. Bank officials were keen to, ‘forestall any Treasury worrying’, regarding 
dealing limits. As American banks entered the market they had the effect of pushing 
up the level of dealing limits.  It was thought that an attack on dealing limits would 
be an embarrassment to British banks, which needed them to effectively conduct 
operations. The Bank’s adoption of a new policy, allowing larger dealing limits, was 
seen as, ‘a purely defensive one forced on us by the very large number of American 
banks now coming to London’. But in insisting upon the maintenance of dealing 
limits Bank officials also believed that they were acting in the interests of the 
Americans, by preventing them from being associated with any decline in sterling’s 
position.68  By this point then, the Bank had already begun to act on behalf of the 
interests of American banks. This was a key moment in the integration of Anglo-
American finance, with the Bank of England now recognising that its responsibilities 
had been Atlanticised through the City’s role in hosting the offshore dollar business 
and the influx of American banks. 
                                                        
66 Mark Mizruchi and Gerald Davis, ‘The Globalization of American Banking, 1962 to 1981’, 
in Dubbin (ed) The Sociology of the Economy, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), pp. 
95-127. 
67 Panitch and Gindin, ‘Making Global Capitalism’; Strange, ‘Lost Hegemony’. 
68 BoE Archives EID4/113 ‘Home Finance: Banking- General Papers 7/12/64-17/11/66’, 
Internal memo, Bank of England- ‘New American Banks in London- Dealing Limits’, March 
5th 1969. 
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There was concern about the American arrivals too. Bank officials reflected 
that people were, ‘constantly wondering aloud whether the large and seemingly 
never-ending influx of American banks into London is an unalloyed benefit’.  
Regarding competition with British banks, it was inferred that British banks’ 
willingness to help their American counterparts suggested that the newcomers were 
not an existential threat. Where competition for clients did appear likely, it was 
anticipated that the greater impact would be upon the UK-based American 
subsidiary clients of other American banks.69  
On balance then, the Americanisation of the Eurodollar market was not 
viewed as a major concern for the Bank in terms of any perceived threat to the 
profitability of British banking. Where concern did arise, it centred upon how the 
Bank ought to adapt its regulatory stance and continue to safeguard sterling. Both 
on the question of lender of last resort responsibility and the issue of dealing limits, 
the Bank was rapidly recalibrating its policy. In the post-war period, the Bank had 
relied upon its relationship with a concentrated and cartelised banking sector to 
manage monetary policy and control credit levels. As the number of foreign banks 
operating in London grew it became increasingly difficult for the Bank to rely on its 
traditional relationship with a closed network of dominant British banks.70 
Economic planning and government management of financial markets became much 
harder. Credit markets were increasingly responsive to global demand fluctuations 
rather than the requirements of the British government.  
The impact of the Euromarkets, then, was to crucially undermine some of the 
foundational struts of post-war Keynesian economic management in Britain, paving 
the way for the transition towards a liberalised financial system that would feed into 
the neoliberal revolution of the Thatcher era. In responding to these manifold new 
challenges, the Bank was adapting to the Euromarkets and creating a new form of 
international financial sovereignty: a form of splintered sovereignty constituted 
                                                        
69 Ibid. 
70 Ranald Michie, ‘The City of London and the British government: the changing relationship’, 
in Michie and Williamson (eds) The British Government and the City of London in the 
Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 44; Michael Moran, 
The Politics of Banking, (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 2. 
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through Anglo-American development. National and international regulatory 
responsibilities became geographically fragmented and overlapping. Although 
hosting a growing number of foreign banks, a key component of the Bank’s 
institutional functions, its role as a lender of last resort, remained exclusively 
national. Simultaneously, the presence of American banks brought the lender of last 
resort responsibility of the Fed into London, internationalising the Fed’s regulatory 
reach and pulling American state sovereignty into the business operations of the 
City.  
 As Burn notes, the Bank’s restored role had echoes of the classical gold 
standard era. 71  Yet Burn neglects the extent to which its role was now 
fundamentally different: the Bank now performed a subordinate and deeply 
integrated role within a new order of global finance that hinged upon an Anglo-
American financial axis based around London and New York. This order did not rest 
upon the strength of sterling, but rather the rising dominance of the dollar as a 
surrogate currency that enabled the maintenance of the City’s international role. In 
important ways, then, the Bank did not restore its old autonomy: it was severely 
circumscribed by subordinate integration with American financial power. Unevenly, 
this compromised both the autonomy of the Bank and the Federal Reserve.  
The Euromarkets produced a fracturing of jurisdictional authority that 
spawned ambiguity over the international and national regulatory responsibilities 
of central banks. This spurred the evolution of regulatory regimes to clarify the 
situation in the following decades. In hugely important ways, then, the development 
of international financial regulation was an outgrowth of the generative force of 
Anglo-American development, with the intensifying interdependence between 
bankers and central banks in London and New York disrupting the existing 
international financial order of sovereign and nationally discreet financial systems.  
The Bank’s experience with the Eurodollar market and its discussion as early 
as 1964 of the limits to jurisdictional authority over foreign bank branches during 
crises, were the progenitors of ‘home country rule’- a key innovation in 
                                                        
71 Burn, ‘City and State’, p. 227; Burn, ‘Global Finance’, p. 184. 
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international financial regulation. Recall that Bank officials concluded that the 
Bank’s lender of last resort responsibility for British banks ‘cannot be held to apply 
in the same measure at all to the London branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks’. 
72 London branches of foreign banks were deemed to fall outside of the purview of 
British authorities. They would instead fall under the responsibility of their head 
offices. Beyond the head offices, national central banks from the originating country 
would take ultimate responsibility.  
In this way, then, ‘home country rule’ attributed the responsibility for 
defining and regulating financial institutions to the state and accorded 
responsibility for foreign branches to their originating national central bank. States 
would look to one another, rather than to supranational organisations, in order to 
legislate and enforce collective agreements on supervision.73 Not only did the Bank 
stumble across this innovative principle in responding to the problems raised by the 
Euromarkets, it also led the development of this principle internationally. Crucially, 
then, Anglo-American development was producing qualitatively distinctive 
institutional mutations that transformed the landscape of global finance.  
The regulatory challenge provided by the Euromarkets, alongside a series of 
major banking crises during the 1970s, led to acceleration in the development of 
international banking supervision.74 As the banking crises of the early 1970s 
unfolded the Governors of the G10 central banks met to hammer out proposals for 
international supervision. These meetings produced the ‘Basle Concordat’, 
circulated widely amongst central banks and supervisory authorities. The Bank led 
these discussions, providing the first two chairmen of the committee.75 The Basle 
                                                        
72 Bo EArchives 6A123/1 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro Currencies- 
Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/1/64-31/7/65’, Report on Meeting of Experts on 
the Euro-currency Markets at the BIS, November 9th -11th 1963. 
73 Ethan Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State, 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996),  p. 324. 
74 The most prominent crises in this respect were the major losses of Lloyds’ Lugano branch, 
the collapse of the Israel British Bank in Tel Aviv, the Franklin National Bank in New York 
and most notably of all the failure of the West German, Bankhaus Herstatt: Capie, ‘Bank of  
England’, p. 625. 
75 Ethan Kapstein, ‘Resolving the regulator's dilemma: international coordination of banking 
regulations’, International Organization, 43 (1989), pp. 323-347. 
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Committee on Banking Supervision, as it came to be known, had a strong British 
makeup, reflecting the Bank’s epistemic authority as an institution at the centre of 
financial globalisation.76 
In addition to the increasingly active stance taken by American authorities in 
managing the international monetary system, therefore, the Bank of England was 
fundamental to developing the supervisory framework required to accommodate 
financial globalisation. Key developments like the Basle Committee of Bank 
Supervisors stemmed from the initiative of the Bank and drew upon its institutional 
learning during the 1960s.77 Kapstein has identified the significance of the combined 
efforts of the Bank and the Fed to solidify the first Basel Accord on capital adequacy 
in the early 1980s. But Kapstein’s account overlooks the deeper context for the Bank 
and the Fed’s combined leadership during the 1980s: that leadership was part of a 
continuum of Anglo-American developmental interdependence intensified by the 
Euromarkets.  
New York and London were functioning as the twin pivots of financial 
globalisation and their attendant monetary authorities played an integral role in 
laying the institutional groundwork for this process. The Fed-Treasury-Wall Street 
nexus was increasingly articulated through and within the City-Bank-Treasury 
nexus as part of an Anglo-American engine-room of financial globalisation. 
Geographically, the City of London became central to the interaction of Anglo-
American developmental dynamics.  This was part of a transatlantic paradox: 
sterling’s decline was accompanied by the City’s rebirth, while the dollar’s ascent led, 
counter-intuitively, to the diminishment of New York’s status. Offshore was a 
distorting mirror through which Anglo-American development was reflected.  
 
The deeper origins of neoliberal deregulation 
 
                                                        
76 Charles Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, A History of the Early 
Years, 1974-1997, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
77 Kapstein, ‘Regulator’s Dilemma’, p. 324. 
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The evolution of the City’s role within a newly Atlanticised framework transformed 
British banking. It created divisions within the City that would threaten the 
coherence of the City-Bank-Treasury nexus. As the Euromarkets grew they 
effectively split the City into two discreet sectors with divergent spatial 
accumulation orientations. On the one hand, an offshore internationalist world over 
which British merchant banks and foreign banks presided, with only a tangential 
relationship to the fate of the national economy. On the other, a domestic cartel of 
British clearing banks that had been more tightly integrated with national industry 
and financing within the Keynesian institutional order and which suffered under the 
continuing travails of the British economy during the 60s and 70s.78 
  American banks brought new management techniques and financial 
innovation into the London market, these led to synthetic forms of Anglo-American 
financial innovation that transformed global financial practices. More importantly, 
these developments further intensified the transatlantic regulatory feedback loop 
by prompting recalibrations of national monetary regimes on both sides of the 
Atlantic to deal with the new competitive challenges thrown up by Anglo-American 
financial development. This section demonstrates that these Anglo-American 
transformations fed through into the deregulation of the early neoliberal period, 
drawing on archival evidence from the Bank of England. These deregulatory 
dynamics were not simply a case of the ascent of neoliberal ideology. They were in 
fact a consequence of competitive processes of financial integration that began with 
the Euromarkets several decades prior.    
The most notable financial innovation that the Americans brought to the City 
was the introduction of Certificates of Deposit in May 1966, a move that was 
mirrored by the issuing of sterling CD’s by British banks from 1968.79 The 
negotiability of CD’s, pioneered in the U.S. money markets earlier in the decade, 
                                                        
78 Michie, City of London, pp45-46. 
79 Certificates of Deposit are negotiable certificates received by the depositor in return for a 
time-deposit placed with a bank: Oxford Dictionary of Finance and Banking, Fourth Edition, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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enabled them to function as liquid assets.80 American banks also introduced the 
‘going-concern’ approach to lending, with future expected earnings rather than the 
resale value of their assets now the principal criteria for evaluating a borrower’s 
creditworthiness. Covenants imposed by American banks, through which they 
monitored the profitability of borrowing businesses, led to an intensified role for 
banks in restructuring business operations in periods of crisis.81 The growth of the 
Euromarkets standardised banking practices on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Techniques of American banks were merged with practices in Britain and then 
exported back to America, driving homogenisation. As new Eurocurrency markets 
emerged in other countries, the banking practices pioneered by British and 
American banks in London began to be transmitted worldwide.82 Another notable 
innovation was the introduction of rollover credits. These new loans, ‘combined the 
interest-rate flexibility of British overdrafts with the legal formality of US medium-
length term loans’. Instead of a fixed interest rate for the entire span of the loan, the 
rate would be fixed for certain intervals of time (3-6 months) and then adjusted in 
line with the changing market rates on bank deposits. The LIBOR rate was used as 
the basis for these calculations, reflecting the international predominance of the 
London market. These innovations were part of a process whereby wholesale 
bankers pioneered techniques for passing on interest rate risks to borrowers at 
rollover dates that were directly linked to funding costs.83 
The growth of offshore banking increased competition for deposits denominated in 
major currencies, with American banks competing for sterling deposits. This had the 
effect of increasing the competitiveness of the sterling deposit market.84British 
                                                        
 
81 Jerry Coakley and Laurence Harris, The City of Capital: London’s Role as a Financial Centre, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp. 138-140. 
82 M. Lewis  & K.  Davis, Domestic & International Banking,( Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan, 
1987).pp. 9 & 83. 
83 Banking Information Service ,International Banking: The role of the Major British Banks, 
(London: Banking Information Service, 1985), p. 11. 
84 Robert Aliber, ‘Eurodollars: An Economic Analysis’, in Savona and Sutja (eds), Eurodollars 
and International Banking, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 77-98; Geoffrey Jones, 
‘Competition and Competitiveness in British Banking, 1918-1971’, in Jones and Kirby (eds) 
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banks were forced to respond to the competitive challenge posed by the Americans. 
While the merchant banks were prominent players in the first decade of the 
Euromarkets, their limited deposit bases restricted their capacity to compete as the 
markets grew.85 The British clearing banks, which avoided a sustained entry into the 
Euromarkets until the 1970s, had been sheltered from competition through their 
cosy relationship with the Bank. 86  The entry of the Americans provided a 
competitive jolt to the British banks. 87To compete with their well-capitalised 
American counterparts, British banks moved towards universal banking and away 
from traditional divisions between merchant and commercial banking.88  
These transformations required a corresponding regulatory recalibration 
and the Conservative government’s 1971 ‘Competition Credit and Control’ (CCC) 
policy offered exactly that. It broke from the moves towards credit rationing by 
administrative decree, which had proliferated during the tight money policy of the 
1960s, freeing up credit markets by substituting price levels for government 
controls as the decisive determinant of credit supply.89  
In fact, then, the origins of the deregulatory dynamics of the 1970s and 1980s 
are traceable to the Anglo-American transformation of financial markets during the 
1960s.  Mirroring the imperatives of CCC and increasingly conscious of the 
competitive challenge that the City posed to New York, deregulation began to gather 
pace in the U.S. Nixon called for the gradual phasing out of interest rate ceilings in 
1973 while the Securities and Exchange Commission brought about New York’s ‘Big 
Bang’ in 1975, breaking from its longstanding support for the cartel-like 
organisations that had dominated American capital markets since the 1930s.90 From 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Comeptitiveness and the State: Government and Business in Twentieth Century Britain, (New 
York: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 120-141. 
85 Jones, ‘Multinational Banking’, p. 326. 
86 Jones, ‘Competition and Competitiveness’, p. 135. 
87 Moran, ‘Politics of Banking’, p. 22. 
88  Stefano Battilossi, ‘Banking with Multinationals: British Clearing Banks and the 
Euromarkets’ Challenge, 1958-1976’, in Battilossi and Cassis (eds), European Banks and the 
American Challenge: Competition and Cooperation in International Banking Under Bretton 
Woods,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 103-135. 
89 Moran, ‘Politics of Banking’, p. 30. 
90 Panitch and Gindin, ‘Making Global Capitalism’, p. 149. 
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the late 1970s, the problem of growing foreign competition for securities business, 
with the London challenge central, further destabilised the SEC’s regulatory 
stance.91   
When the Thatcher government decided to liberalise exchange controls in 
1979, the decision occurred against a backdrop of wider international regulatory 
competition in which competition between Britain and the U.S. was centre stage. In 
the run up to the decision to liberalise, the Bank produced detailed reports on the 
abolition of exchange controls in both the U.S. and Japan.92 Anglo-American 
competition to attract Eurodollar business into their respective financial centres 
provided the definitive context within which the decision over liberalisation 
occurred.  We should, therefore, view the decision to further liberalise exchange 
controls and further open up the City’s financial markets within the broader lineage 
of Anglo-American development and the competition between New York and 
London, which lay at the heart of this process. Liberalisation was not simply a 
consequence of philosophical preferences towards free markets, but rather a 
response to the competitive challenge posed by New York. 
The continuing dynamics of the transatlantic regulatory feedback loop were 
also evidenced in the 1978 proposal by the New York Clearing House Association to 
grant New York a specialised status as a “monetary free trade zone”. The plan 
attempted to draw offshore banking back into the U.S. by encouraging both 
American and foreign banks to establish “International Banking Branches” (IBBs) in 
New York.93 This proposal posed a major competitive challenge to London’s status 
as a centre for offshore banking and was undertaken by the New York authorities 
                                                        
91 David Landau, ‘SEC Proposals to Facilitate Multinational Securities Offerings: Disclosure 
Requirements in the United States and the United Kingdom’, New York University Journal of 
International Law & Politics 19 (1987), pp. 457-478; Bevis Longstreth, ‘Global Securities 
Markets and the SEC’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business and Law, 
10 (1988), pp. 183-193. 
92  BoE Archives, EC5/649, ‘Exchange Control Act File: Relaxations- Papers Covering the 
Relaxation and Dismantling of Exchange Controls 6/9/79-17/9/79’, ‘Exchange Controls in 
the USA’, July 26th 1979; ‘Japan Exchange Control’, July 26th 1979. 
93 BoE Archives, 4A115/3, ‘Monetary Analysis: External Development and Policy Meetings 
4/1/78-28/12/79’, Memo from the Bank of England Overseas Department, ‘New York as a 
Free Trade Banking Zone’, May 31st 1978. 
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with exactly this intention in mind. By drawing the rapidly expanding offshore 
banking business back into New York, it was hoped that major benefits would 
accrue to the city, the U.S. Treasury and the banks themselves.  
Under the new scheme IBBs would be able to make loans to, and take 
deposits from, overseas borrowers, without being encumbered by the reserve 
requirements and interest rate controls that were applied within the U.S. This 
constituted an attempt by American regulators and bankers to consciously and 
strategically reproduce the kind of conditions that had drawn American banks into 
the City of London’s Euromarkets en masse during the 1960s. The plan would 
require the amendment of the Fed’s Regulation D, which as part of the New Deal 
regulatory framework governed the reserve requirements for banks in the U.S. And 
crucially, the plan would also require the amendment of Regulation Q, which 
prohibited payment of interest on deposits that fell short of 30 days.94 
The competitive dynamics between rival financial centres, New York and 
London, that had intensified through the emergence of the Euromarkets were now 
driving the further erosion of the New Deal regulatory architecture in the U.S. and 
the homogenisation of Anglo-American regulatory regimes, as American authorities 
attempted to bring offshore business back under American territorial auspices by 
aping the regulatory climate of the City of London. The transatlantic regulatory 
feedback loop continued to have an enormous impact on regulatory frameworks on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Existing accounts of American financial deregulation 
during the Volcker era have understated the centrality of these Anglo-American 
dynamics.95 Much of what was going on in the transformation of national monetary 
regimes during the later 1970s and 1980s revolved around the attempt to bring 
offshore back onshore by liberalising domestic monetary regimes.  
                                                        
94 BoE Archives, 4A115/3, ‘Monetary Analysis: External Development and Policy Meetings 
4/1/78-28/12/79’, Memo from the Bank of England Overseas Department, ‘New York as a 
Free Trade Banking Zone’, May 31st 1978. 
95 See: William Greider, ‘Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country’, 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 155; Greta Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The 
Political Origins of the Rise of Finance, (London: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 73; 
Panitch and Gindin, ‘Making Global Capitalism’, p. 169. 
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 Between 1978 and 1981, the Euromarkets and offshore banking were 
central to the interactions between British and American monetary authorities. As 
banks on each side of the Atlantic pushed their governments to create regulatory 
conditions favourable to competing internationally, the existing regulatory orders 
gradually broke down.  These effects continued to erode American financial 
regulation during the 1980s. Regulatory transformations in the U.S. then fed back 
into Britain, with the further liberalisation during the 1980s and Thatcher’s own 
‘Big Bang’ carried out after British officials had visited the U.S. in order to learn from 
the American regulatory apparatus.96    
 
 
Conclusion: Anglo-American development and neoliberal deregulation 
 
 
The birth of the Euromarkets in the City of London represented a defining moment 
in the post-war history of global finance. As this article has suggested, existing 
accounts have missed the significance of the emergence of an Anglo-American field 
of development cradled within the City of London and its feedback effects upon the 
U.S. This was not a case of monolithic US structural power shaping the options of 
Britain, but rather of British development, motivated by banking capitalists and the 
Bank in pursuit of their own ends structuring the options of American finance and, 
subsequently, of the monetary and fiscal policies of American state institutions.  By 
treating America’s post-war ascendancy and British decline as separate 
problematiques, scholars have neglected the extent to which Britain’s role was key 
to the transformation of American capitalism, by generating competitive pressures 
that contributed to the dismantlement of the New Deal regulatory architecture and 
reducing the efficacy of unilateral American monetary policy. It was Britain’s 
peculiar imperial history, long-standing commitment to an open international 
                                                        
96 Michael Moran, ‘The State and the Financial Services Revolution: A Comparative Analysis’, 
West European Politics, 17 (1994), pp. 158-177. 
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financial order and the construction of an offshore political-economic space by 
merchant bankers and the Bank, in contrast to the controls put in place by other 
European states, which enabled American banking to break through its national 
boundaries, reconfiguring the international monetary system in the process. 
 This article has argued that Anglo-American development, centred upon a 
series of institutional interdependencies, was central to the reconstitution of global 
finance through the genesis of the Euromarkets. The Euromarkets brought about a 
qualitative transformation in the orientation of British capitalism, tying it 
increasingly into a symbiotic relationship with American state institutions and 
bankers.  Interactive processes of ‘regulatory embrace’ and ‘regulatory escape’ drew 
together a synthetic combination of Anglo-American finance within the City of 
London from the 1960s and set in motion a ‘transatlantic regulatory feedback loop’ 
that played a key role in driving competitive deregulation in London and New York 
during the 1970s and 80s. By unsettling national monetary regimes on both sides of 
the Atlantic, as well as giving rise to a broader reconfiguration of the international 
financial regulatory order through Basle, the Euromarkets played a fundamental 
role in the genesis of financial globalisation and the recalibrated regulatory regimes 
that provided the basis for global finance to expand. It is in this period of regulatory 
disruption and globalising financial innovation that the deeper origins of  financial 
deregulation lay. Conventional accounts have, as this article has shown, overstated 
the determinacy of neoliberal ideology in driving financial deregulation in Britain 
and the US, the two states that are widely identified as the most influential authors 
of neoliberal policies. 
 Through their emergence the Euromarkets compromised national forms of 
financial sovereignty as the new archival evidence in this article has revealed. This 
led to new regulatory concepts such as ‘home country rule’ in order to adjudicate 
regulatory responsibility in a newly globalising era of splintered financial 
sovereignty which complicated and disrupted existing post-war national regulatory 
orders. The Bank’s leadership role, overlooked within existing IPE scholarship, was 
absolutely crucial. Indeed, the coordinated attempts of the Bank of England and the 
Federal Reserve to lead the reformulation of international financial regulation in the 
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decades that followed the birth of the Euromarkets have their roots in the 
interdependencies generated by the attempts of Anglo-American monetary orders 
to manage both the crises of Bretton Woods and the challenges of the Euromarkets 
during the 1960s.  
 In more general terms, the arguments and evidence presented in this article 
should prompt IPE scholars to explore interlinked processes of complex and uneven 
international development in order to understand the transformation of the global 
economic order. These processes are relevant not only to relations between 
developed and underdeveloped countries, but also highly germane for 
understanding the manner in which the power of dominant states such as the U.S. 
has been expressed through complex and co-constitutive patterns of uneven 
interdependence with other major capitalist states. Interdependence with Britain 
did not simply facilitate the expansion of American financial power; it also severely 
compromised aspects of American monetary sovereignty and spurred domestic 
change. In this sense, the relationship between Britain and the U.S., through Anglo-
American developmental processes, has been and continues to be essential to 
understanding the contours of the global political economy. The Euromarkets were 
central to the inter-bank lending freeze during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8 
and the continuing absence of a formal global lender of last resort meant that the 
financial system relied upon ad hoc and delayed interventions by Federal Reserve 
and the Bank of England to pump-prime money markets through Quantitative 
Easing and loose monetary policy. The threat of crisis anchored within the post-war 
Anglo-American order continues to cast a long shadow over the global political 
economy with many of the issues pertinent to their emergence still unresolved 
today. 
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Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Statistical Annex 1962-1970. Yearly values from 
1965-1967, quarterly values thereafter. 
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Source:  Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Statistical Annex 1962-1970. Yearly 
values from 1965-1967, quarterly values thereafter.  
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Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Statistical Annex 1962-1970. Yearly values from 1965-
1967, quarterly values thereafter. 
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Anglo-American Development, the Euromarkets and 
the Deeper Origins of Neoliberal Deregulation 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article challenges existing accounts of the development of the Euromarkets by 
arguing that their emergence constituted the foundational moment in the advent of 
post-war Anglo-American developmental field. The account contends the notion of a 
post-war order shaped predominantly by the outward expansion of American 
financial power, by de-privileging the exclusivity of American power and arguing 
that co-constitutive Anglo-American developmental processes were the generative 
force that produced the Euromarkets . Drawing upon new archival material , the 
article suggests that an Anglo-American developmental sphere, in which Britain 
continued to play a crucial but subordinate role, was key to the unfolding of post-
war financial globalisation. The Anglo-American developmental processes 
occasioned by the Euromarkets gave rise to a ‘transatlantic regulatory feedback loop’ 
that stimulated deregulation on both sides of the Atlantic and placed Anglo-
American capitalist interdependence at the centre of the politics of globalisation .  
The deeper origins of financial deregulation lie in the transformation of Anglo-
American finance during the 1960s. 
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Introduction 
 
 The emergence of the Euromarkets has commonly been understood either as 
a consequence of the changing relationship between states and markets, or as a 
product of the outward expansion of American finance. This article challenges 
prevailing accounts. Drawing upon archival material from the Bank of England and 
the Treasury, the article proposes that the Euromarkets were central to an emerging 
Anglo-American developmental sphere.1 Anglo-American developmental processes 
occasioned by the Euromarkets played a defining role in the politics of globalisation, 
spawning novel institutional forms of hybrid Anglo-American financial development 
in the City of London. These Anglo-American dynamics transformed the regulatory 
                                                        
1 The term ‘Euromarkets’ applies to transactions of offshore currency in two distinct but 
related markets: the ‘Eurocurrency/Eurodollar’ and ‘Eurobond’ markets.  
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orders on both sides of the Atlantic in a highly interactive manner, eroding the 
regulatory architecture of the post-war Keynesian state in Britain and destabilising 
American New Deal regulations. Anglo-American dynamics also reordered the 
broader regulatory context of international banking through the development of 
offshore and the emergence of the Basle regime. The Euromarkets set in motion a 
‘transatlantic regulatory feedback loop’ that destabilised transatlantic regulatory 
regimes. Many of the deregulatory moves in Britain and America during the 
ideological transformation of the ‘neoliberal era’ were incubated during the 1960s.  
The article begins by reviewing existing literature on the Euromarkets, 
suggesting that scholars have overlooked the constitutive role of Anglo-American 
development. An alternative conceptual framework, focusingupon the institutional 
connectivity underpinning Anglo-American development, is then outlined.  In the 
second half, the article turnstowards the institutional outcomes of Anglo-American 
development by examining evidence on Anglo-American interest rate 
interdependence alongside previously unpublished archival evidence from the Bank 
of England and the Treasury, some of which has only recently become available 
under the thirty-year rule. This evidence reveals the impact of arriving American 
banks upon the institutional development of the Bank of England and the 
integration of Anglo-American money markets. A number of novel institutional 
developments, emerging from the co-constitutive interaction of Anglo-American 
finance, and their significance for the broader transformation of the international 
financial system, are discussed. Finally, the article explores the impact of the 
transatlantic regulatory feedback loop and its significance for understanding the 
deeper Anglo-American origins of financial deregulation.  
 
 
States, markets and the Euromarkets 
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The debate over the Euromarkets has focused upon three main themes: firstly, 
attempting to identify their specific historical origins,2 secondly, understanding 
their relevance to Britain’s national development3 and, finally, their relevance to the 
international transformations associated with the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system.4  Within the IPE literature, a subset of scholars has argued that the 
emergence of the Euromarkets was functional to the deepening of American 
structural and financial power associated with American hegemony or imperialism.5 
The IPE literature on the Euromarkets has been criticised for reducing the 
debate to a simple dichotomy between state and market.  Responsibility for the 
development of the Euromarkets is then accorded either to state agencies or market 
operators.  In reality the responsibility for the emergence of the Euromarkets is 
hard to pin down in bifurcated terms. In Britain the key institution, the Bank of 
England, acted as an interface between the state and the market and played the 
roles of ‘poacher and gamekeeper’ simultaneously.6 Blurring the boundary between 
state and market renders conventional IPE accounts of the Euromarkets highly 
problematic. 
Gary Burn’s excellent corrective to the ‘states versus markets’ dichotomy has 
captured many of the institutional and historical specificities of the Euromarkets’ 
                                                        
2 See: Geoffrey Bell, The Euro-dollar Market and the International Financial System, (London: 
Macmillan, 1973); Catherine Schenk, ‘The Origins of the Eurodollar Market in London: 
1955-63’, Explorations in Economic History, 35  (1998), pp. 221-238. 
3 See: Gary Burn, The Re-Emergence of Global Finance, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); 
Geoffrey Ingham, Capitalism Divided? The City and Industry in British Social Development, 
(London: Macmillan, 1984). 
4 See: Fred Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States 
International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977); Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the 
International Monetary System, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Eric Helleiner, 
States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s, (London: 
Cornell University Press, 1994) 
5 See: Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance, 
(London: Verso, 1990); Martijn Konings, The Development of American Finance, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011); Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin ‘Finance and American 
Empire’, in Panitch and Konings (eds),  American Empire and the Political Economy of Global 
Finance, (London: Macmillan, 2009), pp. 17-48; Susan Strange, ‘The Persistent Myth of Lost 
Hegemony’, International Organization, 41 (1987), pp. 551-574. 
6 Burn, ‘The State’, pp. 227 and 241. 
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origins. Burn’s account, however, neglects the substantive impact of Anglo-
American development in recalibrating global capitalism. It is with the interlinking 
Anglo-American developmental processes and institutional transformations arising 
from the Euromarkets, rather than their historical genesis, that this article is 
primarily concerned. Burn’s assertion that the importance of the Eurodollar market 
lies ultimately in, ‘the resurrection of an institutional state structure reminiscent of 
that which defined the pre-1931 City-Bank-Treasury nexus’, overlooks the way in 
which the British state wasqualitatively transformed through its incorporation 
within an Anglo-American developmental sphere. 7  By arguing that the City 
effectively regained its autonomy through the Eurodollar market, Burn neglects the 
extent to which the arrival of the American dollar and American banks in London 
drew American state power into the affairs of the City and redefined British 
sovereignty.8 
 Power did remain concentrated within the City-Bank-Treasury nexus, yet it 
was articulated through and embedded within a new, fundamentally distinctive, 
order of Anglo-American finance. The City-Bank-Treasury nexus remained 
dominant within the British state because it was able to integrate itself within an 
internationalising Federal Reserve-Wall Stre t-Treasury nexus at the heart of 
American capitalism. This new order of Anglo-American finance, embedded within 
an Atlanticised British capitalism, proved central to the incubation of financial 
globalisation and liberalisation that gravely undermined, in synchronicity, the 
Bretton Woods monetary order and national monetary orders  in Britain and the U.S.  
 
 A further grouping of scholars have pointed towards the special role that the 
U.S. has played in the constitution of global capitalism.9 Panitch and Gindin view the 
collapse of Bretton Woods and the emergence of financial globalisation not as a 
consequence of globalising markets escaping the control of national states, but 
                                                        
7 Burn, ‘The State’, p. 227; Burn, ‘Global Finance’, p.184. 
8 Burn, ‘Global Finance’, p. 135. 
9 Gowan, ‘Global Gamble’; Panitch and Gindin, ‘Finance and Empire’; Konings, ‘American 
Finance’. 
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rather as a result of the international expansion of American finance.10 Similarly, 
Konings critiques adherents of the ‘states versus markets’ approach for missing the 
extent to which the globalisation of finance from the 1960s was an outgrowth of 
American finance.11 
 These accounts provide an indispensable tonic to the literature that, 
misleadingly, viewed globalisation in terms of the ‘retreat of the state’. Theorists of 
American power have, however, overlooked the emergent Anglo-American field of 
developmental interactivity that was fundamental to financial globalisation.12 We 
need to look beyond the expansive dynamics of American finance and towards the 
co-constitutive developmental processes that occurred through the interaction of 
bankers and monetary officials in the City and New York. This requires that we de-
privilege the exclusive role of an outward expansion of American finance or 
unilateral American ‘structural power’.  
  Konings’ account makes important correctives to the structural power 
approach by challenging the ontologisation of the states and markets separation and 
elucidating the historical co-articulation of state power and structural power within 
US capitalism. Despite this modification, however, his explanation of post-war 
financial globalisation is overreliant upon a notion of the externalisation of internal 
American developmental dynamics and America’s role in, ‘shaping the preferences 
and influencing the structural conditions under which other actors make 
decisions’.13 Britain’s causal force in authoring financial globalisation is rendered 
invisible. Accordingly, the City becomes an analytical vacuum into which American 
banks simply move in the face of limits upon their internal development. The City is 
                                                        
10 Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of 
American Empire, (London: Verso, 2012), p. 119. 
11 Konings, ‘American Finance’, p. 88. 
12 In a similar vein, Rawi Abdelal has criticised the literature on financial 
globalisation for failing to appreciate Europe’s central role from the 1980s onwards. 
Abdelal, however, overlooks the role of Anglo-America, leaving Britain’s role under 
theorised: Rawi Abdelal (2007) Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
13 Martijn Konings, ‘The Construction of US financial power’, Review of International 
Studies, 35(1) (2009), pp. 69-94. 
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 7 
reduced to a release valve for the contradictions of American finance.14 This focus 
elides the manner in which American structural power was constituted through 
transatlantic interactivity. As formulated by Strange, structural power never came 
to terms with the complex processes of uneven and combined international 
development that generated, often quite accidentally, the institutional capacities 
that underpinned America’s post-war power.15 Without highly contingent and 
specific institutional developments within Britain, that reflected the agency of 
specific social forces and state managers as they wrestled with the distinctive 
challenges of managing Britain’s transition to post-imperial power, there would 
have been no spatial fix for American finance. British state institutions and 
merchant bankers pulled in American finance by adapting their institutional 
orientations and capacities and Atlanticising British capitalism.  
This required a redefinition of sovereignty, both in terms of the spatial 
extension of regulatory responsibility for the Bank of England and the embedding of 
the fiscal basis of the Treasury within the Euromarkets. The under-theorised status 
of the constitution of political-economic space in American power approaches leads 
to an under appreciation of the centrality of the City’s entrepôt role in furthering 
globalisation.16 Britain’s state had been internationalised par excellence during the 
19th century and it was this legacy that was revitalised through the emergence of 
‘offshore’ as a novel form of political-economic space. The intersection of capitalist 
and state agency, through the lobbying power of key merchant bankers, was central. 
In broader terms, Britain’s longstanding entrepôt role was redefined through 
                                                        
14 See: Konings, ‘Construction of US power’, pp. 86-87; ‘American Finance’, pp.93-98. 
15 Strange’s formulation of structural power is circular: America has structural 
power because it can shape the choices and preferences of other actors, but it can do 
so only because it already has acquired structural power. There is no notion of how 
structural power capacities develop diachronically within this ahistorical tautology. 
16 For a discussion of the problem of political space in Panitch and Gindin’s work 
see: J.Z. Garrod ‘A Critque of Panitch and Gindin’s Theory of American Empire’, 
Science & Society, 79:1 (2015), pp. 38-62.  
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‘offshore’ to cope with the demise of sterling and harness the dollar.17 By missing 
these dynamics Konings, along with other scholars, overstates the domestic origins 
of the US turn to monetarism and neoliberalism from the late 1970s and obscures 
the developmental impact of the transatlantic regulatory feedback loop in driving 
financial deregulation.18 It is not enough to read off financial globalisation from the 
‘development of American finance’, we need to problematise ‘Anglo-American 
development’ as the creation of a distinctive form of transatlantic political-economic 
space, more broadly. American banks may have filled that space, but it was the 
British state and British bankers that constructed the ‘offshore’ environment that 
enabled financial globalisation through the City and integrated Anglo-American 
capitalism. This was not, therefore, simply a case of the internationalisation of the 
American state, but rather a synthetic form of Anglo-American development that 
ensured that the American Federal Reserve-Treasury-Wall Street nexus was 
articulated in and through the City-Bank-Treasury nexus in Britain. In the process, 
both national capitalisms were transformed, with a reduction in monetary policy 
autonomy and a deeper integration of their respective financial systems. The post-
war period was not only about the US state structuring the options of other national 
capitalisms, its own policy options and business strategies were structured by 
developmental dynamics driven by social forces in Britain. Understanding this is 
crucial to understanding the subsequent role of Anglo-American leadership in 
driving forward the politics of financial globalisation.  Recognising the significance 
of Anglo-American development serves as an important corrective to the overstated 
role of neoliberal ideology in shaping financial globalisation from the 1980s.19 Many 
of the deregulatory dynamics consummated during the neoliberal era arose as a 
response to processes that emerged during the crisis years of Bretton Woods. 
                                                        
17 For theorisation of the City’s entrepôt role see: G. Ingham ‘Commercial capital and 
British development: a reply to Michael Barratt Brown. New Left Review, 1(172) 
(1988), pp. 45-66. 
18 See: Konings, ‘American Finance’; Greta Krippner, ‘Capitalizing on Crisis: The 
Political Origins of the Rise of Finance, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
19 See in this regard: David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Joel Krieger, Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Decline, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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Conceptualising Anglo-American Development 
 
 
 IPE scholars have emphasised cycles of UK/U.S. hegemony, but rarely considered 
the interactivity of Anglo-American development.20 Examining Britain and the U.S. 
within a unified analytical lens allows us to uncover the constitutive dynamics of 
‘Anglo-American development’ that generated American structural power in the 
post-war period by securing dollar hegemony. The emergence of the Euromarkets 
represents a key instance of Anglo-American development. It sowed the seeds for 
financial globalisation and gravely undermined the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates. The flows of hot money unleashed by the Eurodollar market 
destabilised sterling and the dollar during the 1960s and 1970s.21 By increasing the 
exposure of these two key currencies to speculative attacks, the Eurodollar market 
played a central role in the collapse of fixed exchange rates.  But, paradoxically, the 
Euromarkets entrenched the hegemony of the dollar, ensuring its international 
supremacy even after its fixed convertibility to gold was terminated.  
The lineages of Anglo-American development can be traced back much 
further, to the interwar years. The First World War debilitated Britain and 
strengthened its U.S. creditor.  With sterling and the British economy weakened, the 
City was forced to draw upon American financial support in order to re-launch the 
gold standard and restore sterling convertibility.22 As sterling weakened and the 
                                                        
20 See: Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the 
Mutlinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1975); Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
21 Block, ‘Origins of Disorder’, p. 197; Susan Strange, ‘The Dollar Crisis 1971’, International 
Affairs, 48 (1971), pp. 191-216. 
22 Kathleen Burk,‘The House of Morgan in Financial Diplomacy, 1920-30’, in McKercher (ed) 
Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s: The Struggle for Supremacy, (London: Macmillan, 
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dollar strengthened, the management of the two currencies became increasingly 
intertwined. Britain’s singular role at the centre of the global financial system was 
de-privileged and the U.S. became integral.23  
The failure of Anglo-American management of the inter-war international 
monetary system had a formative impact upon the priorities instituted at Bretton 
Woods. Anglo-American collaboration formed the foundation for the post-war 
international economic order constructed in New Hampshire.24  The new regime 
instituted at Bretton Woods was a direct response to the challenges faced during the 
1920s and 1930s.25 And just as Anglo-American dynamics had been central to the 
interwar period, they were now institutionalised through the Bretton Woods 
agreement. 
A series of key institutional connections between state managers and 
bankers were at the heart of deepening Anglo-American interdependence. The 
Treasuries and central banks of Britain and the U.S. were brought into ever-closer 
contact by their attempts to manage the international monetary system. The 
significance of the City-Bank-Treasury nexus within British development has been 
identified.26 While for the U.S., IPE scholars have recognised the significance of the 
Federal Reserve-Treasury-Wall Street nexus. 27  Scholars have not, however, 
identified the extent to which the Federal Reserve-Treasury-Wall Street complex at 
the heart of American capitalism, has been articulated in and through the 
corresponding City-Bank-Treasury nexus within Britain. This was the broader 
transatlantic context within which the emergence of the Euromarkets occurred.  But 
the key dynamics also reflected the specificities of national capitalist development 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1991), pp. 125-158; Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and 
the Rise of Modern Finance, (London: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 276. 
23 Block, ‘Origins of Disorder’, p. 14; Konings, ‘American Finance’, p. 71. 
24 Peter Burnham, The Political Economy of Post-war Reconstruction, (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1990); John Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization, 36 
(1982), pp. 379-415. 
25 Eichengreen, ‘Globalizing Capital’, p. 91; Louis Pauly, Who Elected the Bankers? 
Surveillance and Control in the World Economy (London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 
45. 
26 Ingham, ‘Capitalism Divided?’.  
27 Gowan, ‘Global Gamble’; Panitch and Gindin, ‘Making Global Capitalism’. 
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within bothcountries. It is to the particular trajectory of Anglo-American 
development that the analysis now turns. 
 
 
Regulatory embrace and regulatory escape 
 
Britain’s 1951 Conservative government was keen to restore the City’s international 
role. But they faced a central dilemma, the international predominance of sterling, 
crucial to the City’s former pre-eminence as an entrepôt centre, was no longer. The 
Conservative ambition to restore the City appeared increasingly incompatible with 
the need to maintain sterling’s fixed exchange rate. For British merchant banks and 
the City to regain their international predominance and fulfil the Conservative’s 
political aspirations to restore the old order of the British state an alternative means 
would have to be found. The solution was the Eurodollar. 
British banks were only able to maintain their international standing by 
switching into the dollar. As British power waned, 28 Not surprisingly, then, it was 
the merchant banks that led the Euromarkets charge, setting the stage for the City’s 
rebirth within a new Anglo-American financial order  
The ‘offshore’ status of the Eurodollar market was unique. An informal 
approach to regulation in the City allowed the Euromarkets to flourish and 
effectively split the British banking system in two.29 In order to do this, the City 
developed a new accountancy category: where at least one party to the transaction 
was British, the transactions were defined as ‘onshore’, but where both parties were 
non-British the transactions were marked in a second ‘offshore’ set of books.  
Offshore was an accounting device that embedded a sovereign bifurcation within 
the City’s regulatory order: onshore activities and entries were subject to national 
financial regulations, while offshore transactions, conversely, fell beyond the 
                                                        
28 Geoffrey Jones, British Multinational Banking, 1830-1990, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 
pp. 248-287. 
29 Burn, ‘City and State’, p.226. Schenk describes this regulatory context as one that, 
‘encouraged innovation as a means of evading controls while tolerating such innovations ex 
post’: Schenk, ‘Origins of Eurodollar’, p. 233.  
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national regulatory remit and within a laissez-faire order of self-regulation spatially 
within, but juridically beyond, the post-war Keynesian state infrastructure of 
financial control. 30  By developing an ‘offshore’ regulatory orientation and 
accountancy technique, the City was able to perpetuate its entrepôt role through the 
dollar. It was the innovation of ‘offshore’ finance then, as a peculiar and intentional 
bifurcation of sovereignty, which enabled the City’s entrepôt role to continue. 
American finance could never have globalised as it did without this British 
institutional innovation.  
 At work here was a process of ‘regulatory embrace’ by which the City’s 
merchant bankers and the Bank of England welcomed the emergence of offshore 
dollar business within the City, establishinga symbiotic relationship with New York 
and the American monetary system.. Here the roles of George Bolton and Siegmund 
Warburg were central. Bolton, a former merchant banker employed by the Bank of 
England, was crucial to establishing the Bank’s early acceptance of the Euromarkets. 
Siegmund Warburg, one of Britain’s premier merchant bankers, was instrumental. 
Warburg had been deeply critical of the limited integration brought about through 
Bretton Woods, calling for greater capital mobility as well as closer financial ties 
between Britain and the US as early as 1950.31 He would be influential in pulling the 
Treasury deeper into the Euromarkets during the 1960s.   
Bolton and Warburg visited America in 1962 to gauge the American mood on 
Eurobonds. Bolton subsequently encouraged the Bank to enable Eurobond issues 
and by early 1963 the approval of the authorities was secured. The first ever 
Eurobond issue was signed in July of 1963, the deal was guided through by Bolton 
while Warburg’s banking house provided the signature.32  
For both Warburg and Bolton, the revival of London’s role as an international 
capital market dealing in foreign currency was a mechanism for promoting British 
                                                        
30 Ronen Palan, The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad 
Millionaires, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 27-32. 
31 Niall Ferguson, High Financier: The Lives and Times of Siegmund Warburg, 
(London: Penguin, 2010) pp. 159-160. 
32 Ian Kerr, A History of the Eurobond Market: The First 21 Years, (London: 
Euromoney, 1984). P14. 
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entry into the EEC by enhancing the City’s continental appeal. Unbound from 
sterling, the City would be beneficial to the EEC and Europeans would not have to 
prop up an ailing currency. Warburg’s correspondences with the Bank implicitly 
threatened that failure to liberalise London’s capital markets might lead to an 
exodus of merchant bankers towards alternative European financial centres in an 
exercise of ‘capital flight’ discipline over the state that would become all too 
common in the era of globalisation.33  
The development of the Euromarkets was driven by the agency of merchant 
bankers in conjunction with state institutions, demonstrating the tight linkages 
between private bank power and the development of the state’s institutional 
capacities. It was the agency of key forces within Britain that facilitated the 
internationalisation of American finance and they did so in order to pursue their 
own distinctive ends of retaining domestic hegemony and deepening European 
financial integration. By doing so they in fact structured American policy options, 
not vice versa, reversing the lines of causality established by American-centric 
perspectives on structural power.  
 The regulatory embrace of the City’s merchant bankers and the Bank was 
matched by a correspondent ‘regulatory escape’ of American banks from the 
restrictive New Deal regulatory regime in the US. Interactivity between the dollar 
supply, monetary policy and the status of the City as an entrêpot centre anchored 
the emergence of the Euromarkets within Anglo-American development.  
After the Great Depression, American monetary authorities introduced 
‘Regulation Q’ and the Glass-Steagall Act.34 Regulation Q capped the interest rate 
that American banks could offer for depositors, while Glass-Steagall maintained a 
strict division between commercial and investment banking.  Despite this restrictive 
context, American finance experienced prolonged growth after the war.35 
                                                        
33 Ferguson, High Financier, pp. 209-218. 
34 Bell, ‘The Euro-dollar Market’, p. 9. 
35 Konings, ‘American Finance’, p. 100. 
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By the later 1950s, however, American banks were frustrated by New Deal 
regulations. 36These restrictions  prompted a ‘regulatory escape’ by large American 
banks seeking to sidestep New Deal regulations and take advantage of London’s 
burgeoning offshore business. In the years that followed American banks overcame 
entered the offshore regulatory space of the City, transforming Anglo-American 
capitalism in the process. 
AClose cooperation  between the Fed and the Bank emerged during the 1960s, as it 
became increasingly clear that collaboration was required to reinforce the 
stuttering Bretton Woods system. These measures gave further impetus to  the 
Euromarkets. 
 Successive U.S. administrations attempted stopgap measures to assuage the 
balance of payments and stabilise the dollar. 37  The Americans were also 
increasingly drawn into the management of Britain’s crisis-stricken monetary policy 
as Britain’s balance of payments problems deepened. From 1964, supporting the 
existing sterling-dollar rate became a fundamental component of U.S. international 
monetary policy.38  Added to this was a simmering geopolitical consideration: the 
Americans’ willingness to support sterling was linked to Britain’s presence in South 
East Asia. The State Department made clear that support for sterling was contingent 
upon Britain acting as a bulwark against communism in the region. Furthermore, 
the U.S. relied upon the Euromarkets to meet the capital needs of American MNCs 
abroad within a context of domestic restrictions on capital outflows and deficits 
fuelled by Vietnam.39Anglo-American monetary cooperation was therefore tightly 
linked to geopolitical considerations. 
    
 
 
Anglo-American financial synthesis in the City 
                                                        
36 Ibid, p. 107. 
37 Eichengreen, ‘Globalizing Capital’, p. 126. 
38Ibid, pp. 123-125. 
39 Catherine Schenk, The Decline of Sterling: Managing the Retreat of an International 
Currency, 1945-1992, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). pp. 167 & 10.  
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American banks arrived in Londonen masse during the 1960s. By 1975, 58 U.S. bank 
branches had been established in the City.40  This section draws upon archival 
material from the Bank of England to examine the consequences of American entry 
into the City. This led to a synthesis of Anglo-American banking practices, increased 
Anglo-American interest rate interdependence and constraints upon the autonomy 
of policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic. It also transformed the Bank’s 
institutional orientation towards a transatlantic outlook. 
For the Bank , the arrival of the Americans raised crucial questions about  
regulation. While for British bankers, their arrival presented a potential competitive 
challenge. But for both the Bank and the bankers, their arrival was also a major 
opportunity. By invigorating and expanding the scope and depth of the Euromarkets, 
the American invasion offered British bankers the chance to take a bigger slice of a 
rapidly growing pie, even if their relative share declined.  
The American influx boosted the standing of the Euromarkets and by 
association, the Bank. This was reflected in the banks status as the epistemological 
authority on the Euromarkets. The arrival of the Americans, enabled the Bank to 
reassert its centrality and significance within the British state and international 
financial community. It was through its interconnection with offshore American 
finance and deepening ties to the Federal Reserve-Treasury-Wall Street nexus that 
the Bank recovered its pre-war international prestige within an international order 
dominated by American power. But the arrival of the Americans also raised 
troubling questions about the status of British merchant banks and increased  
Britain’s sensitivity to American economic policy. 
 The ‘spatial-fix’ of escape into the City necessarily brought about complex 
questions regarding sovereign authority.. American banks now depended upon a 
                                                        
40 Richard Sylla, ‘U.S. Banks and Europe: Strategy and Attitudes’, in Battilossi and Cassis 
(eds) European Banks and the American Challenge: Competition and Cooperation in 
International Banking Under Bretton Woods, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.  
53-74. 
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foreign central bank, but the Bank would be expected to hold closer ties to the old 
order of the City’s banking elite than to the American interlopers.  
For the US Treasury and the Fed, the American takeover of the Euromarkets 
was similarly Janus-faced. By escaping the New Deal regulatory parameters and 
dependence upon the domestic dollar supply, the American banks gravely 
undermined the capacity of American fiscal and monetary policy to control banking. 
This would become all too clear from the mid-1960s. But they had also, quite 
unintentionally, alleviated some of the pressure on the U.S. balance of payments, by 
tapping in to offshore dollar flows, and intensifying the global standing of the dollar 
as a vehicle currency.  
 The scale and pace of the American capture of the Eurodollar market was 
breath-taking. Figure 1.1 below depicts this. Current account deposits of overseas 
residents represent Eurodollar market deposit-taking and the increase is accounted 
for overwhelmingly by increased dollar deposits. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 about here 
 
 
We can see in figure 1.1 that British Overseas and Commonwealth Banks 
experienced a major loss of relative market share, with their share of Eurodollar 
deposits dropping from c.40% in 1962, to c.25% in 1970. Accepting houses also 
experienced a severe contraction of their market share, from 20% down to 8% 
between 1962-1970. For American banks the story was very different. Their share 
of Eurodollar deposits rose precipitously, from just over 20% in 1962, to around 
55% in 1970. 
 By disaggregating deposits into sterling and non-sterling we get a clearer 
picture of the vast take-off in Eurodollar deposits from figure 1.2.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 about here 
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For American banks, the growth in deposits of overseas residents was 
overwhelmingly accounted for by a sharp increase in non-sterling (i.e. dollar) 
deposits. The low level of sterling deposits remained remarkably stable over the 
period. 
 Contrastingly, British Overseas and Commonwealth banks (figure 1.3) 
experienced much more gradual increases in the volume of non-sterling deposits 
from overseas residents. Whereas American banks experienced a sevenfold increase 
in the volume of overseas non-sterling deposits between 1965-1970, British 
Overseas and Commonwealth banks experienced a threefold increase. British banks’ 
relative gains were limited, but they now participated in a level of market expansion 
unimaginable without the influx of American banks and the corporate client base 
that they brought with them. 
 
Figure 1.3 about here 
 
How did the Bank respond to the Americanisation of the Eurodollar market? The 
following archival evidence from the Bank captures the reaction to the arrival of the 
Americans and provides crucial insights into the mechanisms underpinning the 
intensification of Anglo-American development. The Bank really took notice of the 
Americans from 1963, as documented in the regular meeting of Euro-currency 
experts at the BIS. Reporting on the 1963 meeting, Bank officials acknowledged that 
London branches of American banks were more active than before in the Eurodollar 
market, with U.S. businesses borrowing there rather than New York.41  
Correspondence between the Treasury and the Bank provided the primary 
channel of  Euromarkets policy formulation and prompted further development of 
communication channels between them. As well as pulling in American state and 
financial power, then, the Euromarkets helped to solidify the institutional 
                                                        
41 Bank of England Archives 6A123/1 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro 
Currencies- Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/1/64-31/7/65’, Report on Meeting of 
Experts on the Euro-currency Markets at the BIS, November 9th -11th 1963. 
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interdependencies between the Bank, the Treasury and the City. Bank officials 
outlined the parameters of their responsibility for Eurodollar activity in these 
exchanges.42 In correspondence with the Treasury, Bank officials made clear that 
what applied for British banks, regarding the Bank stepping in as a lender of last 
resort, ‘cannot be held to apply in the same measure at all to the London branches 
or subsidiaries of foreign banks’.43 London branches of foreign banks were not 
viewed as the responsibility of British authorities but rather those of their head 
offices. Beyond the head offices, national central banks from the originating country 
would take ultimate responsibility. This discussion occurred within a context 
whereby London branches of American banks now accounted for 30% of deposits in 
the Eurodollar market.  
Crucially then, the City’s hosting of foreign banks did not entail a 
corresponding globalisation of the Bank’s lender of last resort function.  The 
American influx and the hybrid interaction of Anglo-American finance that this was 
occasioning in the City, were forcing the Bank to evolve its regulatory 
responsibilities in a manner that would have a hugely significant bearing on the 
future of international banking. 
As monetary conditions tightened in the U.S., the significance of the 
Eurodollar market increased dramatically. Between 1965 and 1966 a credit squeeze 
in the U.S. and the introduction of the ‘Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint’ 
programme led New York banks to turn to their London branches for funds. The 
Bank noted that this dynamic was practically ‘inevitable’ given that the traditional 
sources of liquidity within the U.S. had dried up. In fact, monetary conditions in the 
U.S. were so difficult that when a Bank official met with a senior member of the 
Chase Manhattan bank in early 1966, the Chase employee suggested that the 
Eurodollar market had been so important for reserve positions that, ‘without it, 
                                                        
42 BoE Archives 6A123/5 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro Currencies- 
Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/1/68-31/5/69’, Memo from Treasury to the Bank 
of England requesting Prime Ministerial brief on the Eurodollar market, October 22nd 1968. 
43 BoE, 6A123/1: Letter regarding document to be prepared by the Bank of England in 
response to a Treasury request for information of the standing of the Eurodollar market, 
March 6th 1964. 
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we’d have been dead’ .44 The Euromarkets enabled American banks to circumvent 
domestic restraints on credit in a way that severely undermined the policy 
autonomy of US officials and meant that the Americans were increasingly forced to 
look to London and the British authorities in order to manage their domestic 
banking system. Anglo-American development was eroding monetary autonomy on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Preoccupations with American structural power fail to 
capture this pronounced increase of American dependency upon British state 
agency. 
Johnson’s restrictive measures and the Fed’s credit crunch in 1966 werea 
watershed for American banks and the Euromarkets. 45 No longer taking only a 
passing interest in the market, American banks identified Eurodollar expansion as 
essential  to their business strategy.46 The Euromarkets transformed the business 
practices of American banks and integrated transatlantic money markets. 
The Bank’s position within the City enabled it to gauge the intensity with 
which the Eurodollar market was being shaped by changes in U.S. monetary policy. 
As more American banks decamped to London, their role in funnelling funds to their 
U.S. head offices led to an increasing interactivity of interest rates on each side of the 
Atlantic, a further symptom of intensifying Anglo-American interdependence.  As we 
can see in figure 2.1 below, a triadic interaction of interest rates evolved during the 
1960s: that between Bank Rate, the Eurodollar Rate and the Federal Funds Rate.   
 
Figure 2.1 about here 
 
 
                                                        
44BoEArchives 6A123/3 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro Currencies- 
Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/8/65-31/10/66’, Memo from Bank of England 
Overseas Office charting U.S. banks drawing dollars through London branches, August 22nd 
1966. 
45 Daniel Kane, The Eurodollar Market and the Years of Crisis, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 
1983), p. 13. 
46 Richard Sylla describes this transformation aptly, suggesting that while American banks 
gave little consideration to operations in Europe before 1963 they, ‘thought about little else 
in the decade thereafter’:  Sylla, ‘U.S. Banks and Europe’, p. 62. 
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The principal relationship here was between the Eurodollar Rate and the Federal 
Funds Rate, with the absence of interest rate ceilings enabling the Eurodollar Rate to 
be set consistently above that of the U.S. money market rate with the effect of 
drawing money out of the U.S. capital markets and into London. Figure 2.1 shows 
that UK Bank Rate was consistently the highest rate of the three. This was needed to 
maintain the attractiveness of sterling holdings in the light of the emergence of the 
Euromarkets but also a measure of sterling’s general weakness. But given the 
increasingly limited role for sterling as a trade and investment currency, and the 
dominant role of the dollar, the impact of the sterling rate upon the price of dollar 
borrowing was not without limits. The differential between the Eurodollar Rate and 
the Federal Funds Rate was more important with respect to the price of dollar 
borrowing. 
 
Figure 2.2 about here 
 
 
 
 
 
Authorities on both sides of the Atlantic were aware of this dynamic. During a U.S. 
Treasury meeting in April 1963, Robert Roosa expressed discontent with the British 
monetary authorities, suggesting that they had pushed up Bank Rate in order to 
keep ahead of the Eurodollar Rate. It was understood that the British action might 
also push up the Eurodollar Rate, aggravating U.S. balance of payments difficulties 
through the resultant capital outflow.47 This dynamic is clearly evidenced in figure 
2.1, which shows that Bank Rate was the highest rate, with the Eurodollar Rate 
below it and the U.S. Federal Funds Rate consistently the lowest of the three. Apart 
from a three-year period, between 1968 and 1971, the British Bank Rate was 
highest.  
                                                        
47 Burn, ‘Global Finance’, p. 158. 
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 During the mid-1960s this relationship intensified. As figure 2.2 shows, there 
was a strong correlation between the Eurodollar Rate and the U.S. Federal Funds 
Rate. Whilst during the early 1960s the Eurodollar Rate was kept marginally above 
the Federal Funds Rate in order to draw money away from the U.S. capital market, 
from the mid-1960s as the U.S. tightened its monetary policy, the Eurodollar Rate 
spiked in response to a massive surge in demand. This was a result of factors that 
the Bank had recognised: by drawing funds from their London branches the New 
York banks were pushing up the price of Eurodollar borrowing.48 This dynamic is 
visible in figure 2.2, with the two Eurodollar Rate spikes that pushed it well over the 
Federal Funds Rate from 1965 to 1967 and then again from 1968 to 1971. 
 Anglo-American financial development in the City restricted the autonomy of 
US policy makers, necessitating greater cooperation and openness with British 
counterparts. Eurodollar movements exerted sustained pressure upon the 
international monetary system. Large-scale American borrowing introduced a, 
‘permanent element of demand’ shaped by economic conditions within the U.S.49 
This integrated the US, Eurodollar and European markets much more tightly. 
Consequently, European capital markets became more exposed to fluctuations in US 
monetary policy, creating a form of hub and spokes relationship. 50  These 
developments contributed to the increasing international monetary disorder of the 
later 1960s and early 1970s.51 
 Eurodollar flows into US money markets were discussed at the BIS in 1966. 
American bank branches had begun granting loans to the head offices of US 
corporations, who lent the money on to their overseas subsidiaries. This method 
                                                        
48 B oE Archives  6A123/3 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro Currencies- 
Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/8/65-31/10/66’, Memo from Bank of England 
Overseas Office charting U.S. banks drawing dollars through London branches, August 22nd 
1966. 
49 Kane, ‘Eurodollar Market’, p. 13. 
50 Ibid. 
51 The ‘Eurodollar slop’, an expanding pool of ex-patriate dollars that tended to move 
predominantly back and forth across the Atlantic, was the underlying root of the dollar 
crisis of 1970/71 that preceded Nixon’s delinking from gold and the de facto termination of 
Bretton Woods: Strange, ‘Dollar Crisis’, p.  198. 
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was devised explicitly to circumvent the Interest Equalization Tax.52 When asked 
about the attitude of the US authorities towards this borrowing, given that it 
weakened the impact of US monetary restraint, Samuel Katz of the Fed replied that 
the borrowing was not a serious problem given its small size. Significantly, Katz 
added that these borrowings were in fact ‘welcome’ given that they had the effect of 
strengthening the dollar’s position and easing the US balance of payments. But as 
the Eurodollar market’s integration with the US money market intensified during 
the latter 1960s, the American attitude hardened. This tougher stance would 
culminate with a failed attempt to win tighter regulation of the markets. In the 
following decades, Euromarkets dynamics hosted in London were a continual thorn 
in the side of US policy-makers.   
 American bank borrowing from London branches surged in1968, stimulated 
by restrictive measures implemented by Johnson. In response, the Fed’s Andrew 
Brimmer suggested that while the Eurodollar market was based in London, ‘its basic 
driving force during the last year has centred in about a dozen large banks in the 
United States’.53 These banks turned to the Eurodollar market to compensate for the 
loss of domestic deposits. Brimmer acknowledged that bidding for Eurodollar funds 
by American banks had pushed up the Eurodollar Rate and made monetary 
management in the US more difficult. US policy makers were now a victim of the 
success of the dollar, finding their actions and autonomy severely constrained by the 
satellite role of the Euromarkets. By constructing the Euromarkets and drawing in 
the dollar, British merchant bankers and the Bank, in conjunction, set in motion 
dynamics that curtailed the scope of American policy-makers. The limits of US 
structural power were not therefore simply the result of developmental 
                                                        
52 BoE Archives 6A123/6 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro Currencies- 
Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/6/69-31/3/70’, Report on the ‘Meeting of Experts 
on the Euro-Currency Market’, July 12th, 1966. 
53 Bank of England Archives 6A123/6 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro 
Currencies- Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/6/69-31/3/70’,  Transcript of 
presentation given by Andrew Brimmer, ‘The Eurodollar Market and the US Balance of 
Payments’, November 17th 1969. 
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‘contradictions’,54 they were the product of the agency of British merchant bankers 
and the Bank of England as they used offshore to resuscitate the City’s entrepôt role. 
 
Banking on the Treasury   
British merchant bankers used the momentum of the Euromarkets to transform the 
fiscal basis of the British state, steering British development towards their interests. 
Pressures to change the financing of the nationalised industries reached fever pitch 
after devaluation in 1967. Eurobonds were now touted as a potential source of 
funds. The Treasury and the Inland Revenue discussed the possibility of easing 
access to the Eurodollar market for British traders. The motivation here was the 
perceived benefit to the British balance of payments with reserves strengthened if 
traders borrowed outside the Sterling Area to finance domestic investment.55   To 
encourage Eurodollar borrowing, a new Bill proposed to make more interest on 
foreign borrowing tax deductible. 
The Treasury and the Bank overrode the Inland Revenue’s concerns about the 
potential impact of a relaxation of borrowing controls upon offshore tax havens. In a 
meeting between Treasury and Bank officials the increased balance of payments 
benefits post-devaluation were stressed. With confidence in sterling low, it was felt 
that any measures that could help bolster Britain’s reserve position were to be 
encouraged.56  The move towards greater Euromarket borrowing would have an 
additional benefit: reducing Britain’s exposure to destabilising short-term capital 
movements.  
By expanding the financing options available to firms, the proposal would lead to, 
‘the average lengthening of our borrowing abroad’, a step which was seen as, ‘in line 
with the Government’s policy of reducing the country’s sensitivity to short-term 
flights of funds’.  Increases in reserves derived from this practice would be a, ‘very 
                                                        
54 Konings, ‘Construction of US Power’, p.80. 
55 National Archives IR40/16006 ‘Discussions with Financial Secretary, Treasury 
and Revenue on whether companies should be encouraged to borrow on Eurodollar 
market 1966-1978’, Memo from Treasury to Inland Revenue, 1968. 
56 NA IR40/16006, ‘Meeting between Financial Secretary, treasury and Bank of 
England Officials, 17th May 1968. 
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real gain’, and, ‘would be recognized as such in every financial centre in the world’. 
57 The Bank firmly supported the proposal and the Treasury agreed that the Inland 
Revenue’s tax objections were, ‘insubstantial’.58 By the end of May 1968, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer had concluded that the balance of payments benefits 
outweighed the tax difficulties.59 Quite perversely, then, the growing offshore 
market that had enabled vast movements of hot money previously unseen during 
the post-war period was now viewed as the most viable means to insulate Britain 
from speculative movements.  Capital controls were ruled out and the solution 
appeared to be an even tighter integration with the vicissitudes of the Euromarkets.  
The increased appeal of the Euromarkets owed to the active lobbying of Britain’s 
merchant bankers from the mid-1960s. Treasury officials reported to the Inland 
Revenue that, ‘merchant bankers at home and abroad have been urging for some 
time that if certain tax impediments were removed U.K. firms and public bodies 
would be able to raise large sums in medium and long term issues of Eurodollar 
bearer bonds’.60  Foremost among these merchant banker advocates was Warburg.  
In 1965 Warburg had, alongside Hambros and Rothschilds, pressured the Bank to 
exempt foreign bonds issued in London from stamp duty. They also pressed the 
Treasury to remove income tax deductions from interest on bonds issued by 
companies based in the UK.61 Harold Wilson relied heavily upon Warburg for 
financial advice during the 1960s, with his firm advising the government on 
currency questions and public sector finances.62 
Long term borrowing requirements of the nationalised industries had, since 
1956, been financed wholly through the Exchequer.63  This meant that their 
                                                        
57 NA IR140/16006, ‘Note by the Financial Secretary on Eurodollar Borrowing’, May 
1968. 
58 Ibid. 
59 NA IR140/16006, ‘Memo from Inland Revenue to Treasury Officials’, 29th May 
1968. 
60 NA IR140/16006, ‘Treasury letter to the Inland Revenue’, October 4th 1967. 
61 Ferguson, ‘Warburg’, p. 225. 
62 Ibid, p. 285. 
63 NA IR40/16006, ‘Memo from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Treasury’, 
September 13th 1967. 
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borrowing requirements were aggregated with other government borrowing. 
During the 1960s the funds required for borrowing had grown rapidly.  The 
problem became one of financing investment without weakening Britain’s balance 
of payments. Merchant bankers advocated greater Euromarket borrowing for the 
government, local authorities and the nationalised industries. Warburg declared to 
the Exchequer that borrowing from the Euromarkets would be “good for the 
credit”.64  
The City’s merchant bankers were pushing Britain deeper into the embrace of 
private capital markets. The lobbying efforts of Warburg and others bore fruit: in 
1969 the Gas Council raised £31 million through deutschmark denominated 
Eurobond issues, and by October of 1971 British public sector agencies had raised 
£51 million through this channel.65 The Euromarkets intensified banking power in 
Britain, not only by pulling American banks into Britain en masse, but also by 
energising merchant banker’s efforts to render government fiscal policy compatible 
with their interests.  
This was not simply a case of the outward expansion of American finance, then, 
or of the restoration of the old order of British capitalism, but rather the further 
intensification of a qualitatively distinctive Anglo-American sphere of development. 
The Euromarkets fundamentally Atlanticised British capitalism, bringing about a 
structural transformation in the orientation of key state institutions through which 
they embraced the emergence of offshore Euromarkets finance. In doing so they 
transformed the structures within which American policy makers and bankers 
operated and undermined the existing American financial order. 
 
 
The transatlantic regulatory feedback loop 
 
                                                        
64 NA IR40/16006, ‘Treasury paper on the possibility of borrowing abroad to 
finance the nationalised industries and local authorities’, May 25th 1967. 
65 Ferguson, ‘Warburg’, p. 285. 
Page 70 of 85Proof For Review Only
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 26
This section traces the dynamics and effects of the transatlantic regulatory feedback 
loop that emerged during the 1960s and stimulated processes of financial 
deregulation that gathered pace in the following decades. Bankers in Britain and 
America lobbied their national monetary authorities to enable further liberalisation 
to ensure the maintenance of competitive advantages, while central banks were 
forced to adjust their regulatory stance in response to the new challenges and 
jurisdictional ambiguities thrown up by the Euromarkets. By increasing the 
competitive pressure on British banks, the American influx destabilised the 
prevailing regulatory order within the City.  These dynamics would pave the way for 
the financial liberalisation that gathered momentum on both sides of the Atlantic 
during the 1970s and 1980s.  
It is in the 1960s, then, that many of the originating Anglo-American 
developmental processes that subsequently fed into financial deregulation are 
located. Although the continuity of transformative processes linking the ‘post-war’ 
and ‘neoliberal’ eras of global capitalism has been astutely observed, the peculiarly 
Anglo-American accent of these transformations and their situation within the 
broader context of post-war Anglo-American development, have been overlooked.66 
Crucially, these Anglo-American dynamics also transformed patterns of 
international financial sovereignty and contributed towards a major recalibration of 
international banking regulation.  
 Interdependent monetary dynamics between the U.S. and the Euromarkets 
during the later 1960s began to affect the regulatory stance of the Fed. In August of 
1969, the Fed introduced a 10% marginal reserve requirement for U.S. bank 
liabilities to overseas branches and on funds acquired by overseas branches from 
their U.S. head offices while also adjusting the required reserve level for other 
channels of offshore funding. The Eurodollar market was driving regulatory 
transformations on both sides of the Atlantic. Anglo-American developmental 
dynamics, centred upon financial integration, were at the heart of regulatory 
transformations in the world’s two most important financial centres. For their part 
                                                        
66 Konings, ‘American Finance’, p. 12; Panitch and Gindin, ‘American Empire’, p. 19. 
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American officials allowed Eurodollar expansion, but they certainly did not devise it 
as a coherent pre-planned strategy for augmenting American financial power.  
Nevertheless, there were regulatory changes undertaken in the U.S. in order 
to facilitate internationalisation.67 But on balance the regulatory and policy context 
within the U.S. was more disabling than encouraging, with tight money in the U.S. 
and attempts to restrict lending from domestic offices the principal policy catalysts 
for international expansion.68 This was a case of the regulatory escape of American 
banks from the restrictive New Deal regulatory apparatus and the series of 
measures undertaken to curb the chronic U.S. deficits position in order to save 
Bretton Woods. Once the market emerged, however, American policy makers 
certainly did seek to make use of it in order to promote their perceived national 
interests. In this respect then, both Panitch and Gindin, and Strange, correctly 
highlight its functionality to the deepening of American financial power.69 American 
monetary authorities were coming to terms, in a complex and contradictory fashion, 
with an enormously fluid period in the history of the international monetary system. 
For the Bank, the regulatory pressure emanated from the arrival of American 
banks with large deposit bases and a desire to exceed the dealing limits of British 
banks. Bank officials were keen to, ‘forestall any Treasury worrying’, regarding 
dealing limits. As American banks entered the market they had the effect of pushing 
up the level of dealing limits.  It was thought that an attack on dealing limits would 
be an embarrassment to British banks, which needed them to effectively conduct 
operations. The Bank’s adoption of a new policy, allowing larger dealing limits, was 
seen as, ‘a purely defensive one forced on us by the very large number of American 
banks now coming to London’. But in insisting upon the maintenance of dealing 
limits Bank officials also believed that they were acting in the interests of the 
Americans, by preventing them from being associated with any decline in sterling’s 
                                                        
67 Andrew Brimmer and Frederik Dahl, ‘Growth of American International Banking: 
Implications for Public Policy’, The Journal of Finance, 30 (1975), pp. 341-363. 
68 Mark Mizruchi and Gerald Davis, ‘The Globalization of American Banking, 1962 to 1981’, 
in Dubbin (ed) The Sociology of the Economy, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), pp. 
95-127. 
69 Panitch and Gindin, ‘Making Global Capitalism’; Strange, ‘Lost Hegemony’. 
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position.70  By this point then, the Bank had already begun to act on behalf of the 
interests of American banks. This was a key moment in the integration of Anglo-
American finance, with the Bank of England now recognising that its responsibilities 
had been Atlanticised through the City’s role in hosting the offshore dollar business 
and the influx of American banks. 
There was concern about the American arrivals too. Bank officials reflected 
that people were, ‘constantly wondering aloud whether the large and seemingly 
never-ending influx of American banks into London is an unalloyed benefit’.  
Regarding competition with British banks, it was inferred that British banks’ 
willingness to help their American counterparts suggested that the newcomers were 
not an existential threat. Where competition for clients did appear likely, it was 
anticipated that the greater impact would be upon the UK-based American 
subsidiary clients of other American banks.71  
On balance then, the Americanisation of the Eurodollar market was not 
viewed as a major concern for the Bank in terms of any perceived threat to the 
profitability of British banking. Where concern did arise, it centred upon how the 
Bank ought to adapt its regulatory stance and continue to safeguard sterling. Both 
on the question of lender of last resort responsibility and the issue of dealing limits, 
the Bank was rapidly recalibrating its policy. In the post-war period, the Bank had 
relied upon its relationship with a concentrated and cartelised banking sector to 
manage monetary policy and control credit levels. As the number of foreign banks 
operating in London grew it became increasingly difficult for the Bank to rely on its 
traditional relationship with a closed network of dominant British banks.72 
Economic planning and government management of financial markets became much 
                                                        
70 BoE Archives EID4/113 ‘Home Finance: Banking- General Papers 7/12/64-17/11/66’, 
Internal memo, Bank of England- ‘New American Banks in London- Dealing Limits’, March 
5th 1969. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ranald Michie, ‘The City of London and the British government: the changing relationship’, 
in Michie and Williamson (eds) The British Government and the City of London in the 
Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 44; Michael Moran, 
The Politics of Banking, (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 2. 
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harder. Credit markets were increasingly responsive to global demand fluctuations 
rather than the requirements of the British government.  
The impact of the Euromarkets, then, was to crucially undermine some of the 
foundational struts of post-war Keynesian economic management in Britain, paving 
the way for the transition towards a liberalised financial system that would feed into 
the neoliberal revolution of the Thatcher era. In responding to these manifold new 
challenges, the Bank was adapting to the Euromarkets and creating a new form of 
international financial sovereignty: a form of splintered sovereignty constituted 
through Anglo-American development. National and international regulatory 
responsibilities became geographically fragmented and overlapping. Although 
hosting a growing number of foreign banks, a key component of the Bank’s 
institutional functions, its role as a lender of last resort, remained exclusively 
national. Simultaneously, the presence of American banks brought the lender of last 
resort responsibility of the Fed into London, internationalising the Fed’s regulatory 
reach and pulling American state sovereignty into the business operations of the 
City.  
 As Burn notes, the Bank’s restored role had echoes of the classical gold 
standard era. 73  Yet Burn neglects the extent to which its role was now 
fundamentally different: the Bank now performed a subordinate and deeply 
integrated role within a new order of global finance that hinged upon an Anglo-
American financial axis based around London and New York. This order did not rest 
upon the strength of sterling, but rather the rising dominance of the dollar as a 
surrogate currency that enabled the maintenance of the City’s international role. In 
important ways, then, the Bank did not restore its old autonomy: it was severely 
circumscribed by subordinate integration with American financial power. Unevenly, 
this compromised both the autonomy of the Bank and the Federal Reserve.  
The Euromarkets produced a fracturing of jurisdictional authority that 
spawned ambiguity over the international and national regulatory responsibilities 
of central banks. This spurred the evolution of regulatory regimes to clarify the 
                                                        
73 Burn, ‘City and State’, p. 227; Burn, ‘Global Finance’, p. 184. 
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situation in the following decades. In hugely important ways, then, the development 
of international financial regulation was an outgrowth of the generative force of 
Anglo-American development, with the intensifying interdependence between 
bankers and central banks in London and New York disrupting the existing 
international financial order of sovereign and nationally discreet financial systems.  
The Bank’s experience with the Eurodollar market and its discussion as early 
as 1964 of the limits to jurisdictional authority over foreign bank branches during 
crises, were the progenitors of ‘home country rule’- a key innovation in 
international financial regulation. Recall that Bank officials concluded that the 
Bank’s lender of last resort responsibility for British banks ‘cannot be held to apply 
in the same measure at all to the London branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks’. 
74 London branches of foreign banks were deemed to fall outside of the purview of 
British authorities. They would instead fall under the responsibility of their head 
offices. Beyond the head offices, national central banks from the originating country 
would take ultimate responsibility.  
In this way, then, ‘home country rule’ attributed the responsibility for 
defining and regulating financial institutions to the state and accorded 
responsibility for foreign branches to their originating national central bank. States 
would look to one another, rather than to supranational organisations, in order to 
legislate and enforce collective agreements on supervision.75 Not only did the Bank 
stumble across this innovative principle in responding to the problems raised by the 
Euromarkets, it also led the development of this principle internationally. Crucially, 
then, Anglo-American development was producing qualitatively distinctive 
institutional mutations that transformed the landscape of global finance.  
The regulatory challenge provided by the Euromarkets, alongside a series of 
major banking crises during the 1970s, led to acceleration in the development of 
                                                        
74 Bo EArchives 6A123/1 ‘Economic Intelligence Department Files: Euro Currencies- 
Including Euro Dollars and Euro Bonds 1/1/64-31/7/65’, Report on Meeting of Experts on 
the Euro-currency Markets at the BIS, November 9th -11th 1963. 
75 Ethan Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State, 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996),  p. 324. 
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international banking supervision.76 As the banking crises of the early 1970s 
unfolded the Governors of the G10 central banks met to hammer out proposals for 
international supervision. These meetings produced the ‘Basle Concordat’, 
circulated widely amongst central banks and supervisory authorities. The Bank led 
these discussions, providing the first two chairmen of the committee.77 The Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision, as it came to be known, had a strong British 
makeup, reflecting the Bank’s epistemic authority as an institution at the centre of 
financial globalisation.78 
In addition to the increasingly active stance taken by American authorities in 
managing the international monetary system, therefore, the Bank of England was 
fundamental to developing the supervisory framework required to accommodate 
financial globalisation. Key developments like the Basle Committee of Bank 
Supervisors stemmed from the initiative of the Bank and drew upon its institutional 
learning during the 1960s.79 Kapstein has identified the significance of the combined 
efforts of the Bank and the Fed to solidify the first Basel Accord on capital adequacy 
in the early 1980s. But Kapstein’s account overlooks the deeper context for the Bank 
and the Fed’s combined leadership during the 1980s: that leadership was part of a 
continuum of Anglo-American developmental interdependence intensified by the 
Euromarkets.  
New York and London were functioning as the twin pivots of financial 
globalisation and their attendant monetary authorities played an integral role in 
laying the institutional groundwork for this process. The Fed-Treasury-Wall Street 
nexus was increasingly articulated through and within the City-Bank-Treasury 
nexus as part of an Anglo-American engine-room of financial globalisation. 
                                                        
76 The most prominent crises in this respect were the major losses of Lloyds’ Lugano branch, 
the collapse of the Israel British Bank in Tel Aviv, the Franklin National Bank in New York 
and most notably of all the failure of the West German, Bankhaus Herstatt: Capie, ‘Bank of  
England’, p. 625. 
77 Ethan Kapstein, ‘Resolving the regulator's dilemma: international coordination of banking 
regulations’, International Organization, 43 (1989), pp. 323-347. 
78 Charles Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, A History of the Early 
Years, 1974-1997, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
79 Kapstein, ‘Regulator’s Dilemma’, p. 324. 
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Geographically, the City of London became central to the interaction of Anglo-
American developmental dynamics.  This was part of a transatlantic paradox: 
sterling’s decline was accompanied by the City’s rebirth, while the dollar’s ascent led, 
counter-intuitively, to the diminishment of New York’s status. Offshore was a 
distorting mirror through which Anglo-American development was reflected.  
 
The deeper origins of neoliberal deregulation 
 
The evolution of the City’s role within a newly Atlanticised framework transformed 
British banking. It created divisions within the City that would threaten the 
coherence of the City-Bank-Treasury nexus. As the Euromarkets grew they 
effectively split the City into two discreet sectors with divergent spatial 
accumulation orientations. On the one hand, an offshore internationalist world over 
which British merchant banks and foreign banks presided, with only a tangential 
relationship to the fate of the national economy. On the other, a domestic cartel of 
British clearing banks that had been more tightly integrated with national industry 
and financing within the Keynesian institutional order and which suffered under the 
continuing travails of the British economy during the 60s and 70s.80 
  American banks brought new management techniques and financial 
innovation into the London market, these led to synthetic forms of Anglo-American 
financial innovation that transformed global financial practices. More importantly, 
these developments further intensified the transatlantic regulatory feedback loop 
by prompting recalibrations of national monetary regimes on both sides of the 
Atlantic to deal with the new competitive challenges thrown up by Anglo-American 
financial development. This section demonstrates that these Anglo-American 
transformations fed through into the deregulation of the early neoliberal period, 
drawing on archival evidence from the Bank of England. These deregulatory 
dynamics were not simply a case of the ascent of neoliberal ideology. They were in 
                                                        
80 Michie, City of London, pp45-46. 
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fact a consequence of competitive processes of financial integration that began with 
the Euromarkets several decades prior.    
The most notable financial innovation that the Americans brought to the City 
was the introduction of Certificates of Deposit in May 1966, a move that was 
mirrored by the issuing of sterling CD’s by British banks from 1968.81 The 
negotiability of CD’s, pioneered in the U.S. money markets earlier in the decade, 
enabled them to function as liquid assets.82 American banks also introduced the 
‘going-concern’ approach to lending, with future expected earnings rather than the 
resale value of their assets now the principal criteria for evaluating a borrower’s 
creditworthiness. Covenants imposed by American banks, through which they 
monitored the profitability of borrowing businesses, led to an intensified role for 
banks in restructuring business operations in periods of crisis.83 The growth of the 
Euromarkets standardised banking practices on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Techniques of American banks were merged with practices in Britain and then 
exported back to America, driving homogenisation. As new Eurocurrency markets 
emerged in other countries, the banking practices pioneered by British and 
American banks in London began to be transmitted worldwide.84 Another notable 
innovation was the introduction of rollover credits. These new loans, ‘combined the 
interest-rate flexibility of British overdrafts with the legal formality of US medium-
length term loans’. Instead of a fixed interest rate for the entire span of the loan, the 
rate would be fixed for certain intervals of time (3-6 months) and then adjusted in 
line with the changing market rates on bank deposits. The LIBOR rate was used as 
the basis for these calculations, reflecting the international predominance of the 
London market. These innovations were part of a process whereby wholesale 
                                                        
81 Certificates of Deposit are negotiable certificates received by the depositor in return for a 
time-deposit placed with a bank: Oxford Dictionary of Finance and Banking, Fourth Edition, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 
83 Jerry Coakley and Laurence Harris, The City of Capital: London’s Role as a Financial Centre, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp. 138-140. 
84 M. Lewis  & K.  Davis, Domestic & International Banking,( Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan, 
1987).pp. 9 & 83. 
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bankers pioneered techniques for passing on interest rate risks to borrowers at 
rollover dates that were directly linked to funding costs.85 
The growth of offshore banking increased competition for deposits denominated in 
major currencies, with American banks competing for sterling deposits. This had the 
effect of increasing the competitiveness of the sterling deposit market.86British 
banks were forced to respond to the competitive challenge posed by the Americans. 
While the merchant banks were prominent players in the first decade of the 
Euromarkets, their limited deposit bases restricted their capacity to compete as the 
markets grew.87 The British clearing banks, which avoided a sustained entry into the 
Euromarkets until the 1970s, had been sheltered from competition through their 
cosy relationship with the Bank. 88  The entry of the Americans provided a 
competitive jolt to the British banks. 89To compete with their well-capitalised 
American counterparts, British banks moved towards universal banking and away 
from traditional divisions between merchant and commercial banking.90  
These transformations required a corresponding regulatory recalibration 
and the Conservative government’s 1971 ‘Competition Credit and Control’ (CCC) 
policy offered exactly that. It broke from the moves towards credit rationing by 
administrative decree, which had proliferated during the tight money policy of the 
1960s, freeing up credit markets by substituting price levels for government 
controls as the decisive determinant of credit supply.91  
                                                        
85 Banking Information Service ,International Banking: The role of the Major British Banks, 
(London: Banking Information Service, 1985), p. 11. 
86 Robert Aliber, ‘Eurodollars: An Economic Analysis’, in Savona and Sutja (eds), Eurodollars 
and International Banking, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 77-98; Geoffrey Jones, 
‘Competition and Competitiveness in British Banking, 1918-1971’, in Jones and Kirby (eds) 
Comeptitiveness and the State: Government and Business in Twentieth Century Britain, (New 
York: Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 120-141. 
87 Jones, ‘Multinational Banking’, p. 326. 
88 Jones, ‘Competition and Competitiveness’, p. 135. 
89 Moran, ‘Politics of Banking’, p. 22. 
90  Stefano Battilossi, ‘Banking with Multinationals: British Clearing Banks and the 
Euromarkets’ Challenge, 1958-1976’, in Battilossi and Cassis (eds), European Banks and the 
American Challenge: Competition and Cooperation in International Banking Under Bretton 
Woods,  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 103-135. 
91 Moran, ‘Politics of Banking’, p. 30. 
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In fact, then, the origins of the deregulatory dynamics of the 1970s and 1980s 
are traceable to the Anglo-American transformation of financial markets during the 
1960s.  Mirroring the imperatives of CCC and increasingly conscious of the 
competitive challenge that the City posed to New York, deregulation began to gather 
pace in the U.S. Nixon called for the gradual phasing out of interest rate ceilings in 
1973 while the Securities and Exchange Commission brought about New York’s ‘Big 
Bang’ in 1975, breaking from its longstanding support for the cartel-like 
organisations that had dominated American capital markets since the 1930s.92 From 
the late 1970s, the problem of growing foreign competition for securities business, 
with the London challenge central, further destabilised the SEC’s regulatory 
stance.93   
When the Thatcher government decided to liberalise exchange controls in 
1979, the decision occurred against a backdrop of wider international regulatory 
competition in which competition between Britain and the U.S. was centre stage. In 
the run up to the decision to liberalise, the Bank produced detailed reports on the 
abolition of exchange controls in both the U.S. and Japan.94 Anglo-American 
competition to attract Eurodollar business into their respective financial centres 
provided the definitive context within which the decision over liberalisation 
occurred.  We should, therefore, view the decision to further liberalise exchange 
controls and further open up the City’s financial markets within the broader lineage 
of Anglo-American development and the competition between New York and 
London, which lay at the heart of this process. Liberalisation was not simply a 
consequence of philosophical preferences towards free markets, but rather a 
response to the competitive challenge posed by New York. 
                                                        
92 Panitch and Gindin, ‘Making Global Capitalism’, p. 149. 
93 David Landau, ‘SEC Proposals to Facilitate Multinational Securities Offerings: Disclosure 
Requirements in the United States and the United Kingdom’, New York University Journal of 
International Law & Politics 19 (1987), pp. 457-478; Bevis Longstreth, ‘Global Securities 
Markets and the SEC’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business and Law, 
10 (1988), pp. 183-193. 
94  BoE Archives, EC5/649, ‘Exchange Control Act File: Relaxations- Papers Covering the 
Relaxation and Dismantling of Exchange Controls 6/9/79-17/9/79’, ‘Exchange Controls in 
the USA’, July 26th 1979; ‘Japan Exchange Control’, July 26th 1979. 
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The continuing dynamics of the transatlantic regulatory feedback loop were 
also evidenced in the 1978 proposal by the New York Clearing House Association to 
grant New York a specialised status as a “monetary free trade zone”. The plan 
attempted to draw offshore banking back into the U.S. by encouraging both 
American and foreign banks to establish “International Banking Branches” (IBBs) in 
New York.95 This proposal posed a major competitive challenge to London’s status 
as a centre for offshore banking and was undertaken by the New York authorities 
with exactly this intention in mind. By drawing the rapidly expanding offshore 
banking business back into New York, it was hoped that major benefits would 
accrue to the city, the U.S. Treasury and the banks themselves.  
Under the new scheme IBBs would be able to make loans to, and take 
deposits from, overseas borrowers, without being encumbered by the reserve 
requirements and interest rate controls that were applied within the U.S. This 
constituted an attempt by American regulators and bankers to consciously and 
strategically reproduce the kind of conditions that had drawn American banks into 
the City of London’s Euromarkets en masse during the 1960s. The plan would 
require the amendment of the Fed’s Regulation D, which as part of the New Deal 
regulatory framework governed the reserve requirements for banks in the U.S. And 
crucially, the plan would also require the amendment of Regulation Q, which 
prohibited payment of interest on deposits that fell short of 30 days.96 
The competitive dynamics between rival financial centres, New York and 
London, that had intensified through the emergence of the Euromarkets were now 
driving the further erosion of the New Deal regulatory architecture in the U.S. and 
the homogenisation of Anglo-American regulatory regimes, as American authorities 
attempted to bring offshore business back under American territorial auspices by 
aping the regulatory climate of the City of London. The transatlantic regulatory 
                                                        
95 BoE Archives, 4A115/3, ‘Monetary Analysis: External Development and Policy Meetings 
4/1/78-28/12/79’, Memo from the Bank of England Overseas Department, ‘New York as a 
Free Trade Banking Zone’, May 31st 1978. 
96 BoE Archives, 4A115/3, ‘Monetary Analysis: External Development and Policy Meetings 
4/1/78-28/12/79’, Memo from the Bank of England Overseas Department, ‘New York as a 
Free Trade Banking Zone’, May 31st 1978. 
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feedback loop continued to have an enormous impact on regulatory frameworks on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Existing accounts of American financial deregulation 
during the Volcker era have understated the centrality of these Anglo-American 
dynamics.97 Much of what was going on in the transformation of national monetary 
regimes during the later 1970s and 1980s revolved around the attempt to bring 
offshore back onshore by liberalising domestic monetary regimes.  
 Between 1978 and 1981, the Euromarkets and offshore banking were 
central to the interactions between British and American monetary authorities. As 
banks on each side of the Atlantic pushed their governments to create regulatory 
conditions favourable to competing internationally, the existing regulatory orders 
gradually broke down.  These effects continued to erode American financial 
regulation during the 1980s. Regulatory transformations in the U.S. then fed back 
into Britain, with the further liberalisation during the 1980s and Thatcher’s own 
‘Big Bang’ carried out after British officials had visited the U.S. in order to learn from 
the American regulatory apparatus.98    
 
 
Conclusion: Anglo-American development and neoliberal deregulation 
 
 
The birth of the Euromarkets in the City of London represented a defining moment 
in the post-war history of global finance. As this article has suggested, existing 
accounts have missed the significance of the emergence of an Anglo-American field 
of development cradled within the City of London and its feedback effects upon the 
U.S. This was not a case of monolithic US structural power shaping the options of 
Britain, but rather of British development, motivated by banking capitalists and the 
                                                        
97 See: William Greider, ‘Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country’, 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 155; Greta Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The 
Political Origins of the Rise of Finance, (London: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 73; 
Panitch and Gindin, ‘Making Global Capitalism’, p. 169. 
98 Michael Moran, ‘The State and the Financial Services Revolution: A Comparative Analysis’, 
West European Politics, 17 (1994), pp. 158-177. 
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Bank in pursuit of their own ends structuring the options of American finance and, 
subsequently, of the monetary and fiscal policies of American state institutions.  By 
treating America’s post-war ascendancy and British decline as separate 
problematiques, scholars have neglected the extent to which Britain’s role was key 
to the transformation of American capitalism, by generating competitive pressures 
that contributed to the dismantlement of the New Deal regulatory architecture and 
reducing the efficacy of unilateral American monetary policy. It was Britain’s 
peculiar imperial history, long-standing commitment to an open international 
financial order and the construction of an offshore political-economic space by 
merchant bankers and the Bank, in contrast to the controls put in place by other 
European states, which enabled American banking to break through its national 
boundaries, reconfiguring the international monetary system in the process. 
 This article has argued that Anglo-American development, centred upon a 
series of institutional interdependencies, was central to the reconstitution of global 
finance through the genesis of the Euromarkets. The Euromarkets brought about a 
qualitative transformation in the orientation of British capitalism, tying it 
increasingly into a symbiotic relationship with American state institutions and 
bankers.  Interactive processes of ‘regulatory embrace’ and ‘regulatory escape’ drew 
together a synthetic combination of Anglo-American finance within the City of 
London from the 1960s and set in motion a ‘transatlantic regulatory feedback loop’ 
that played a key role in driving competitive deregulation in London and New York 
during the 1970s and 80s. By unsettling national monetary regimes on both sides of 
the Atlantic, as well as giving rise to a broader reconfiguration of the international 
financial regulatory order through Basle, the Euromarkets played a fundamental 
role in the genesis of financial globalisation and the recalibrated regulatory regimes 
that provided the basis for global finance to expand. It is in this period of regulatory 
disruption and globalising financial innovation that the deeper origins of  financial 
deregulation lay. Conventional accounts have, as this article has shown, overstated 
the determinacy of neoliberal ideology in driving financial deregulation in Britain 
and the US, the two states that are widely identified as the most influential authors 
of neoliberal policies. 
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 Through their emergence the Euromarkets compromised national forms of 
financial sovereignty as the new archival evidence in this article has revealed. This 
led to new regulatory concepts such as ‘home country rule’ in order to adjudicate 
regulatory responsibility in a newly globalising era of splintered financial 
sovereignty which complicated and disrupted existing post-war national regulatory 
orders. The Bank’s leadership role, overlooked within existing IPE scholarship, was 
absolutely crucial. Indeed, the coordinated attempts of the Bank of England and the 
Federal Reserve to lead the reformulation of international financial regulation in the 
decades that followed the birth of the Euromarkets have their roots in the 
interdependencies generated by the attempts of Anglo-American monetary orders 
to manage both the crises of Bretton Woods and the challenges of the Euromarkets 
during the 1960s.  
 In more general terms, the arguments and evidence presented in this article 
should prompt IPE scholars to explore interlinked processes of complex and uneven 
international development in order to understand the transformation of the global 
economic order. These processes are relevant not only to relations between 
developed and underdeveloped countries, but also highly germane for 
understanding the manner in which the power of dominant states such as the U.S. 
has been expressed through complex and co-constitutive patterns of uneven 
interdependence with other major capitalist states. Interdependence with Britain 
did not simply facilitate the expansion of American financial power; it also severely 
compromised aspects of American monetary sovereignty and spurred domestic 
change. In this sense, the relationship between Britain and the U.S., through Anglo-
American developmental processes, has been and continues to be essential to 
understanding the contours of the global political economy. The Euromarkets were 
central to the inter-bank lending freeze during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8 
and the continuing absence of a formal global lender of last resort meant that the 
financial system relied upon ad hoc and delayed interventions by Federal Reserve 
and the Bank of England to pump-prime money markets through Quantitative 
Easing and loose monetary policy. The threat of crisis anchored within the post-war 
Anglo-American order continues to cast a long shadow over the global political 
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economy with many of the issues pertinent to their emergence still unresolved 
today. 
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